Fascism vs Law

The factual bases of this injunction, as related in this order and opinion, are sobering. It is offered here in its entirety. You can also download the pdf  HERE and at THIS online link. For the most part, working judges are upholding the Constitution, almost alone among the institutions our liberties depend upon.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

No. 0:25-cv-4669 (KMM/DTS)

ORDER

Susan Tincher, John Biestman, Janet Lee,

Lucia Webb, Abdikadir Noor, and Alan

Crenshaw, on behalf of themselves and

other similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Kristi Noem, Secretary of U.S.

Department Of Homeland Security; Todd

Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration

And Customs Enforcement (ICE); Marcos

Charles, Acting Executive Associate

Director, Enforcement And Removal

Operations (ERO), ICE; David

Easterwood, Acting Field Office Director,

ERO, ICE Saint Paul Field Office; John A.

Condon, Acting Executive Associate

Director, Homeland Security

Investigations; the Department of

Homeland Security; Unidentified Federal

Agencies; and Unidentified Federal

Agents; in their official capacities,

Defendants.

In early December 2025, the Department of Homeland Security launched Operation

Metro Surge, an ongoing enforcement effort that has led to an unprecedented increase in

federal law enforcement presence to enforce immigration laws in Minnesota. In this case,

six named Plaintiffs who have protested and observed these enforcement activities claim

that their First and Fourth Amendment rights have been violated and request both

declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition to demanding relief on their own behalf, they

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also seek to represent a class of persons who record, observe, and protest the immigration

enforcement officers and their efforts.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

(Dkt. 16.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiffs Susan Tincher, John Biestman, Janet Lee, Lucia Webb, Abdikadir Noor, and

Alan Crenshaw are individuals who have observed or protested U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) activity taking place in and around the Twin Cities.

Plaintiffs allege that, despite remaining law abiding when engaging in those protected

activities, Defendants subjected them to the use of chemical irritants, intimidation,

including by pointing firearms at them, detention, and arrest, in violation of their First and

Fourth Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 17, 2025, seeking to vindicate their First

and Fourth Amendment rights. They also seek to represent a proposed class, which they

define as: “All persons who do or will in the future record, observe, and/or protest against

the DHS immigration operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4,

2025.” (Id. ¶ 179 (“Proposed Class”).) The Complaint asserts five class claims: (1) “First

Amendment—Free Speech, Free Press, Free Assembly”; (2) “First Amendment—

Retaliation”; (3) “Fourth Amendment—Unlawful Seizure and Excessive Force”; (4) “Civil

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Conspiracy”; and (5) “Declaration of Rights, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.” (Dkt. 1 at 56–60.1) The

Complaint also includes 14 declarations total from the named Plaintiffs and nonparties.

The next day, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (Dkt. 16.) with an

initial proposed order seeking extensive injunctive relief (Dkt. 19). They subsequently filed

a more narrowly tailored request for relief. (Dkt. 38.) The day after that, on December 19,

2025, the Court held a status conference. The Court converted the motion for a temporary

restraining order into a motion for a preliminary injunction and set a briefing schedule on

the motion.2 (Dkt. 24; see Dkt. 23 (minute entry).) Plaintiffs sought a more expedited

briefing schedule, but the Court provided Defendants with additional time to allow for an

opportunity to provide the Court with a full response. The Court also set a deadline for the

parties to request an evidentiary hearing, but neither party requested such a hearing. Over

the next few weeks, Plaintiffs continued to file additional evidence.

3 Defendants filed a

response to Plaintiffs’ motion and a declaration. (Dkt. 46 (Response); Dkt. 47 (Decl. of

Defendant David Easterwood).)

On January 13, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the motion and allowed the

parties to submit additional relevant video evidence. (See Dkt. 70.) Both parties submitted

additional evidence.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all page numbers refer to the CM/ECF pagination.

2 Throughout the Order, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is

referred to as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

3 See Declarations of Beatriz Leon, Kevin Riach, Carla Hennes, Claire Smith,

Gabrielle Holboy, Luke Mielke, Mark Hackman, Christopher Lee Beal, Wesley Burdine,

Troy Carrillo, Theresa Del Rosario, Thomas Ett, Elizabeth Jackson, Christopher Juhn,

Kirsten Koerth, Ann Kreitman, Judith Levy, Hallie Patterson, and Abigail Salm.

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II. Factual Background4

A. Arrests

1. Arrest of Plaintiff Susan Tincher

Ms. Tincher is a longtime resident of the Near North neighborhood in Minneapolis.

(Dkt. 1-1 (“Tincher Decl.” ¶ 1.) On December 9, 2025, Tincher woke up around 6:30 a.m.

to alerts that ICE was in her neighborhood and drove to the intersection of 21st Street and

Oliver Avenue “with the intent to observe and record what [she] saw happening.” (Id. ¶¶ 2–

3.) Upon arriving, she saw “several people” who she believed to be federal immigration

agents5 wearing masks and bulletproof vests with “POLICE” and “ERO”6 labels standing

outside a house. (Id. ¶ 4.) A vehicle with flashing lights was parked partially on the

sidewalk and additional unmarked vehicles blocked access to crosswalks. (Dkt. 1-10

(“Rollins Decl.”7) ¶ 4; Dkt. 1-12 (“Sorensen Decl.”8) ¶ 6.) The agents appeared to have

4 The Court focuses on the substantial evidentiary record developed by the parties

over the last several weeks. Operation Metro Surge, and the protests occurring in response,

have also been the subject of extensive media coverage, both in Minnesota and nationwide.

And that attention has increased in recent weeks, following the shooting of a protester by

law enforcement. Although the Court relies on media coverage when specifically cited by

the parties or for broad uncontested facts (e.g., the large number of agents involved in the

current operation), videos, commentary, photographs, and reporting on these issues

generally are not before the Court, and do not form the basis of this Order.

5 The Court uses the terms “agent” and “officer” interchangeably.

6 “ERO” is an acronym for Enforcement and Removal Operations, an arm of the

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agency within the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”).

7 Katherine Rollins is an attorney and a Minneapolis resident who lives near where

Ms. Tincher was arrested. (See Rollins Decl. ¶¶ 1–3, 6.)

8 Nik (Nicole) Sorensen, a Minneapolis resident, was “one of the first observers to

arrive” at the scene of Ms. Tincher’s arrest. (Sorensen Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4.)

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“set up a perimeter around the house.

” (Tincher Decl. ¶ 5; see also Sorensen Decl. ¶ 9.)

Ms. Tincher saw “a few” individuals observing from “a safe distance.

” (Tincher Decl. ¶ 6;

see also Rollins Decl. ¶ 16 (stating that there were “at most” seven observers who “kept

their distance from the agents and did not threaten or impede the[m]”); Sorensen Decl.

¶ 16.)

Tincher exited her car and began walking toward the house “to get a sense of what

was happening.

” (Tincher Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.) From the sidewalk, about six feet from the agents,

Tincher, who had her hands “down” with “neutral body language” (Sorensen Decl. ¶ 10),

asked them, “Are you ICE?” (Tincher Decl. ¶ 7.) One agent approached Tincher and

instructed her from “about one or two feet” away to “get back.” (Id.) Tincher heard other

officers say “‘Get back!’ and ‘Take her down!’” (Id.) Within “[a]bout 15 seconds,” several

agents grabbed Tincher and “pulled [her] to the ground.

” (Id. ¶ 8; see also Rollins Decl.

¶ 12.) Tincher was then handcuffed “while . . . on the ground, facedown in the snow[.]”

(Tincher Decl. ¶ 9.) At around this point, Sorensen began to record the incident. (See

Sorensen Decl. ¶¶ 11–13.)

Ms. Tincher “think[s]” the agents said that she was being arrested for obstructing a

federal officer. (Tincher Decl. ¶ 9.) But according to Ms. Rollins, Tincher “did not . . .

physically resist the agents in any way” and “did not taunt or threaten the agents, . . . make

any threatening gestures toward [them,] or take any action to endanger or impede the[m]”

at any point. (Rollins Decl. ¶¶ 13–14.) While still on the ground, Tincher told observers

her name and yelled for help because she “was afraid [she] was being kidnapped” and

arrested “for no reason.” (Id. ¶ 10; see also Rollins Decl. ¶ 13; Tincher Video 0:00–0:12,

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0:44–1:11.

9) Sorensen saw one of the federal agents recording them. (Sorensen Decl.

¶ 18.

10) As the agents arrested Tincher and placed her in an unmarked car, Sorensen heard

an agent say, “You are under arrest. This is what you get for interfering.” (Id. ¶ 14; Tincher

Decl. ¶ 11.) While at times blurry, video of the incident does not show Tincher to be

resisting the arrest as agents took her to an ICE vehicle and placed her inside. (Tincher

Video 1:37–1:59.)

The agents took Ms. Tincher to the Whipple Federal Building, where they removed

her clothes and cut off her wedding ring before shackling her. (Tincher Decl. ¶¶ 11–16;

Rollins Decl. ¶ 15.) “[M]ore than five hours” after the arrest, officers from Homeland

Security Investigations (“HSI”) read Tincher her rights and asked if she would speak to

them without a lawyer present. (Tincher Decl. ¶ 16.) After she declined, the officers told

Tincher that she would be charged with obstructing a federal officer, and she was released.

(Id. ¶ 17.) Ms. Tincher’s clothes were never returned, and she suffered bruising from the

arrest. (Id. ¶ 18.)

9 MPR News, “Woman observing ICE arrested during early morning action in

north Minneapolis,” YouTube (Dec. 9, 2025),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIC0uFP0x9M&t=22s (“Tincher Video”) (embedded

in Jon Collins, Federal agents arrest citizen observer watching ICE detain neighbors on her

north Minneapolis block, MPR News (Dec. 9, 2025),

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2025/12/09/federal-agents-arrest-citizen-observer-

watching-ice-north-minneapolis (cited Dkt. 47 at 11 n.8)) (last visited Jan. 14, 2026.)

10 Ms. Rollins and Sorensen observed individuals that had appeared with the agents,

who appeared to be members of the media, filming at the scene before they got into a

vehicle with the agents and left. (Rollins Decl. ¶ 17; Sorensen Decl. ¶¶ 15, 18.)

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Since the incident, which Ms. Tincher describes as a “frightening experience that

would scare anybody,” she continues to monitor her neighborhood chat and believes that

she would go observe ICE activity again. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Defendant David Easterwood’s Account

Defendant David Easterwood, the Acting Field Office Director for ERO’s St. Paul

Field Office, provides a different narrative of what occurred leading up to Ms. Tincher’s

arrest. He confirms that ICE agents were conducting a criminal investigation in

Minneapolis when “a small number of protesters started to gather, blow whistles, and

record on their phones.” (Dkt. 47 (“Easterwood Decl.”) ¶ 24.) Ms. Tincher then “attempted

to enter the established perimeter of the operation” and, despite being instructed “multiple

times to step back,” she “verbally refused” and “expressed her continued intent to cross

into the established perimeter[.]” (Id.) Even when an officer “positioned her body to

prevent [Tincher] from entering the perimeter,” she “continued to defy instructions to move

back” and “attempted to push the ICE officer out of the way.” (Id.)

The officer warned that Ms. Tincher would be arrested “for impeding a federal

officer” before attempting to handcuff her in a “standing position,

” but she “continued to

actively resist.” (Id.) The officers “placed [Tincher] on the ground” and then handcuffed

her. (Id.) She “continued to try to pull away from the ICE officers” while being escorted to

a vehicle and “refused to get in[],” requiring the officers to “pick her up and lift her in[]”

before taking her to an ICE processing center. (Id.) In the vehicle, Tincher “unbuckled her

seatbelt and attempted to uncuff herself.” (Id.)

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Following the hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants were unable to locate

any video footage of this incident. (Dkt. 78 at 1.) Easterwood’s description of the events is

based on an HSI report that was submitted under seal to supplement the record. (Dkt. 79.)

The report echoes Easterwood’s account. ICE officers involved in the enforcement

activities describe Ms. Tincher approaching the perimeter; refusing commands to get back;

stating that she would enter the area via a nearby sidewalk because it was a public space;

and eventually attempting to push past a female officer to get into the area. (Id. at 20.)

2. Arrest of Plaintiff Abdikadir Noor

Mr. Noor is a 43-year-old resident of Fridley, Minnesota. (Dkt. 1-5 (“Noor Decl.”)

¶ 1.) He is Somali American and a U.S. citizen. (Id.) On December 15, 2025, while Noor

was out with his wife and a friend, Noor noticed some cars behind them, one of which he

initially thought was a police car with its lights on. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Thinking he was being

pulled over, Noor “stopped and pulled into a safe spot.” (Id.) As people “in plain clothes,”

military vests, and masks exited the cars, Noor realized they were ICE agents and saw them

approaching one of the other vehicles occupied by “two Latinos.

” (Id. ¶¶ 2–4.)

Four masked agents passed by Mr. Noor and “surrounded” the other vehicle. (Id.

¶ 5.) Noor called out to the occupants of the car, “You don’t have to show them anything.

Don’t roll down your window or unlock your door!” in an attempt “to tell them about their

rights,” but they did not appear to speak English. (Id. ¶ 6.) Around then, another woman

arrived and “started telling the Latino people to exercise their rights and telling ICE to

leave.

” (Id. ¶ 7.) At that point, a crowd began to gather. (Id.)

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As the woman stood on the sidewalk, “an ICE agent grabbed her hand to get her to

move,” and “[s]omeone in the crowd grabbed her other hand they started to tussle.” (Id.

¶ 8.) The agent “thr[ew]” the woman on the ground and “put his knee on her back.

” (Id.)

Someone in the crowd said the woman was pregnant, and the crowd, including Noor,

“started yelling at ICE to let her go.” (Id.) While the woman was pinned to the ground, face

down in the snow for about 30 minutes, “other agents broke the windows of the car the

Latinos were in and pulled them out,

” seemingly without showing a warrant. (See id. ¶¶ 9–

10.) As the crowd threw snow at the agents, Noor saw one of the agents call for backup

and told people “not to throw things” and “to be peaceful” because they “needed to save

the lady, and . . . to save the agent from himself.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Noor also “tried to keep people

back from the agents.” (Id.) “Suddenly,” the agent kneeling on the woman “drag[ged] her

by her hand to his car” but let go because “[h]e couldn’t quite get her there, at which point

she “was able to get up and leave.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

At some point, additional agents had arrived and “decided to focus on” Mr. Noor.

(Id. ¶ 13.) He describes his arrest as follows:

One of the[] [agents] said something like “let’s get this guy” to

the other agents. They all walked toward me. I heard one of

them say something to me about ICE, but I don’t know what.

They grabbed me and threw me on the ground and handcuffed

me. I have bruises on my knees and my head from this.

(Id.) Noor was put in a car with an agent who drove “about 85 miles per hour” to the

Whipple federal building. (Id. ¶ 14.) The agents did not put a seatbelt on him and refused

to “slow down and to let [him] put on a seatbelt” when he asked. (Id.)

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At the Whipple building, the agents looked at Mr. Noor’s passport, while saying

things like, “[T]hey all come here fraudulently. 50% are here fraudulently”; “Somalis

drained Minnesota”; and “Somalis should go back home.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Noor was shackled,

placed in a cell, and eventually read his rights, to which Noor responded that he wanted a

lawyer. (Id. ¶ 16.) He was detained until about 6:00 p.m. and was not charged or given any

paperwork upon release. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Defendant Easterwood’s Account

According to Mr. Easterwood, ICE officers were attempting to arrest a noncitizen

when a “group of 60-70 protesters surrounded the officers and began throwing rocks and

snowballs, assaulting, taunting, challenging, and yelling ‘kill yourself’ and other

obscenities[.]” (Easterwood Decl. ¶ 27.) The officers witnessed a female protester trying

to spray paint a government vehicle. (Id.) They were unsuccessful in their attempt to arrest

her because of her “continued resistance” and another protester “pulling her away from the

officers[.]” (Id.)

Mr. Easterwood states that Mr. Noor was “[l]eading some of the[] protestors” by

“threaten[ing] to interfere, act[ing] aggressively, push[ing] up into ICE officers’ faces,

shout[ing] obscenities, and thr[owing] rocks and ice at ICE officers.” (Id.) The officers,

who were “[g]reatly outnumbered,” tried to leave but “were blocked in by a growing crowd

of protestors and their vehicles.” (Id.) Local authorities arrived in response to the ICE

officers’ requests for backup for “crowd control” and “help[ing] . . . officers leave the

area.” (Id.) But the local authorities “left soon thereafter despite the crowd’s escalating

hostility against ICE officers” because the situation “lack[ed] what they perceived to be an

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emergency[.]” (Id.) The ICE officers sustained injuries, and their vehicles were damaged

from the incident, during which two protesters, including Mr. Noor, were arrested. (Id.)

Defendants supplemented the record concerning these events by filing an incident

report under seal. (Dkt. 78 at 2; Dkt. 79-1.) The incident report describes how a large group

of 60 or more protesters had formed near the ICE efforts to secure the target of their

investigation in the back seat of a vehicle; some of the demonstrators threw objects

(apparently ice and snow) at ICE officers who called for backup; and as agents attempted

to get their vehicles out of the area, they deployed pepper spray to disperse the crowd.

(Dkt. 79-1 at 1.) Further, the report indicates that an officer “straddled [a] protestor that

was down on the ground to protect him from the ongoing struggle . . . as well as to detain

him until it could be sorted out what his role was in the incident. A member of [the backup

team] said they wanted him cuffed and arrested.” (Id.) Presumably, this portion of the

report refers to the arrest of Mr. Noor, but it does not identify or describe any conduct in

which he was allegedly involved that formed the basis for his arrest.

Videos

There are multiple videos in the record relevant to Mr. Noor’s arrest. In one video,

agents can be seen standing over a woman on the ground, struggling to detain her while

concurrently telling protesters to get back. During this scrum, one officer points a stun gun

at protesters and another aims what appears to be a cannister of a chemical irritant. (First

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Noor Video 0:08–0:35.11) Protesters yelled at the officers and explain that the woman was

pregnant. (Id. 0:08–0:35.) The agents tell the woman to stop resisting as they pull her onto

her stomach, with the agents then kneeling on her back. (Id. 0:20–0:30.) After a cut in the

video, one officer can be seen standing, holding the arm of the woman who is face down,

and pointing his stun gun at individuals out of frame. (Id. 0:35–0:44.) Protesters appear to

be approaching to observe and voice their displeasure, with the individuals in frame

approximately 10–20 feet from that officer. (Id. 0:35–0:44.) The other agent, who appears

to be 5–10 feet from two protesters, is seen on the phone. As he speaks into the phone, he

is hit with a handful of loose snow thrown by a protester. (Id. 0:36–0:39.) Audio of a 911

call from a Homeland Security officer telling the dispatcher that the officers needed

immediate assistance because agents were getting “surrounded” and “attacked,” and “60

to 70 agitators” were present and “fighting” the officers. (Id. 0:35–1:14.)

A smattering of snowballs begins to fly, and officers are hit by many, as the woman

on the ground begins to try to get away from the officer. (Id. 0:45–0:59.) Regaining control

of the woman, the officers begin to spray a chemical irritant intermittently toward parts of

a crowd that has come and broadly encircled the officers as additional snowballs are thrown

toward the officers. (Id. 0:59–1:08.) The officers then begin to move, dragging the woman

11 MPR News, While ICE agents call for backup, Minneapolis residents hurl insults

and snowballs, YouTube (Dec. 16, 2025),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgQpVsY92vs&t=4s (“First Noor Video”).

(embedded in Jon Collins, ICE agents call for backup during Minneapolis traffic stop,

bystanders hurl insults and snowballs, MPR News (December 17, 2025),

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2025/12/15/ice-agents-call-for-backup-during-

minneapolis-traffic-stop) (cited by Dkt. 47 at 12–13 n.9–11)) (last visited Jan 14, 2026).

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along behind them, causing more snow to fly, and the officers spray more chemical irritant.

(Id. 1:08–1:18.) Another protester can be seen pulling the woman’s leg to free her and the

officer lets go and begins to leave the scene. (Id. 1:18–1:26.)

It is at this point that Noor can be seen in the background for the first time, appearing

to hold a phone up to record the officers as they run away. (Id. 1:25–1:26.) Sometime later,

after local law enforcement has arrived on the scene and the area is relatively calm, both

protesters and officers intermix on the street and the officers begin to leave the area.

(Second Noor Video 0:00–7:35.

12) At one point, a protester appears to get close to an

officer, and the officer extends a nightstick to get the protester to backup, at which point

Noor can be seen with a phone in one hand recording and the other arm outstretched to

indicate that the protester back up. (Id. 7:33–7:39.) As other protesters begin to walk toward

the officer, Noor holds his arms up to indicate that they stay back and appears to be saying

something to the officer. (Id. 7:39–7:44.) As a couple of protesters attempt to get closer to

the agent, Noor pushes the protesters away. (Id. 7:44–7:47.)

Then, Noor becomes more animated as he sees the officers involved with the

attempted arrest of the pregnant woman, taking a couple of steps closer and gesturing at

them. (Id. 7:46–7:51.) At the same time, he pushes another protester away from the officers.

(Id. 7:49–51.) He again appears to say something to the agents and gestures at the them as

they enter their vehicle. (Id. 7:51–8:04.) He is about 10 to 15 feet from the agents. (Id.

12 Liban Show, ICE IN MINNEAPOLIS DEC-15-2025, Facebook,

https://www.facebook.com/reel/25466791863009518 (last visited Jan. 14, 2026) (“Second

Noor Video”).

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7:51–8:04.) Noor then steps within 5 to 8 feet of the vehicle door and out of frame, but his

shadow appears to show him gesturing and swinging his arms around in the direction of

other agents outside of the car. (Id. 8:05–8:10.) The view of exactly what happens next is

obstructed by another protester, but Noor suddenly moves backward, and a different agent

takes his spot in the frame. (Id. 8:10–8:13.) Noor then begins to back away from the car.

(Id.8:13–8:15.) The agent sitting in the vehicle then steps out, gathers himself, and

communicates with the other agents outside the vehicle. (Id. 8:14–8:24.) That agent then

says, “Let’s get him. Right here,” and he and another agent step up to Noor, grab him, and

swing him to the ground. (Id. 8:24–8:31.) Protesters step forward to attempt to push the

officers, one of which falls over Noor, who lies face down on the pavement. (Id. 8:31–

8:37.) Noor briefly lifts his chest off the ground with his forearms, before another officer

grabs his hand and Noor returns to his chest. (Id. 8:39–8:42.) Noor continues to lie on the

ground as the officer slowly lifts him up and places him in a government vehicle. (Id. 8:42–

10:07.) At no time during his arrest does Noor appear to resist the officers.13

B. Following Agents by Car

In Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and in the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs and other non-

parties, they describe efforts to observe ICE activities by following ICE vehicles and

sharing information about what ICE is doing in the community. In declarations from

Plaintiffs Lucia Webb, John Biestman, and Janet Lee, and from numerous other

13 After the hearing, Defendants submitted additional video evidence to the Court

under seal. (Dkt. 78 at 2 (referring to exhibits submitted under seal).) These videos do not

depict Mr. Noor’s arrest, nor do they provide additional relevant context that was not

already in the record.

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Minnesotans, they describe how this following activity has led federal law enforcement

officers to stop them, accuse them of impeding or interfering with federal investigations,

and otherwise instruct them not to continue engaging in this method of observation.

1. Stop of Plaintiff Lucia Webb

On December 3, 2025, Ms. Webb, a thirty-one-year-old Minneapolis resident, heard

about ICE activity in South Minneapolis and drove there “to document all the things ICE

has been doing to disrupt [the] city.” (Dkt. 1-4 (“Webb Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2.) Once Webb

arrived, she saw vehicles with “dark tinted windows and Virginia license plates” that other

observers were looking into and confirmed had ICE agents driving them. (Id. ¶ 3.)

When the ICE vehicles drove away, Ms. Webb followed to “let[] other people know

where they were headed.” (Id. ¶ 4.) She was “fairly certain [she] stayed a few car lengths

behind” the ICE vehicles and “didn’t run any red lights or ignore traffic signals,” reminding

herself “to stay calm and to be careful.” (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) Webb followed them to the Whipple

Federal Building, where she saw “more ICE vehicles” and, among “many” others, an agent

“standing in the middle of the road and gesturing like a traffic controller.

” (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.)

Webb initially stopped because she was unsure “what to do or where to go” but moved

forward into a parking lot once “it seemed like the agent in the road was waving [her]

through.

” (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.)

Suddenly, Ms. Webb found herself surrounded by “something like four cars,” and

five agents approached, which “scared and confused” her. (Id. ¶ 8.) As the agents began

talking to her, she started recording the interaction. (Id.) One masked agent said that Webb

“had been chasing them, breaking traffic laws and running red lights,” which they claimed

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to have on video. (Id. ¶ 9.) When Webb denied the accusations, the agent told her that she

would be “arrested for impeding” if she did not stop following the officers. (Id.) Webb said

that she “should have the right to follow the[] [agents] and observe them on public streets”

and said she was “ashamed of them for “kidnapping people[.]” (Id. ¶ 10.) In response, the

agents insulted her. (Id.)

The incident left Ms. Webb “really shaken, both emotionally and physically[.]” (Id.

¶ 11.) She collected herself “for a while” before “[driving] home crying and upset[.]” (Id.)

Since then, Webb has experienced “a lot of trouble concentrating,” which has interfered

with her work; “more trouble sleeping than usual”; and “paranoi[a]” when she sees cars

with tinted windows nearby. (Id. ¶ 12.)

The following day, Ms. Webb was in a friend’s car following ICE vehicles with

other observers, when a car “pull[ed] a U-turn . . . and [stopped] in the middle of [the

street], impeding traffic generally, but specifically blocking” other cars that were following

the ICE vehicles. (Id. ¶ 13.) Masked agents exited one of the other vehicles and aimed a

gun at nearby observers who were on foot and in the other cars that had been following the

ICE vehicles. (Id.) One of the agents “smack[ed]” an observer’s car and appeared to put

“the front end of his gun . . . inside that car’s window.” (Id.) Later, as the agents drove

away, Webb and her friend followed until they decided that the agents “were driving too

fast.” (Id.) Webb saw the agents’ car run a red light, which was “very frightening given it

was rush hour.” (Id.)

Ms. Webb states that she “will continue to observe and tell agents what [she] thinks

about their actions,” in part “to let the government know that [she doesn’t] like what they’re

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doing to [her] neighbors, and that it is far beyond what should be considered normal or ok.”

(Id. ¶ 12.) However, she plans to “try not to go out alone when [she] ha[s] the option to be

with another person.” (Id.)

2. Stop of Plaintiffs John Biestman and Janet Lee

Mr. Biestman lives in Minneapolis with his wife, Ms. Lee. (Dkt. 1-2 (“Biestman

Decl.”) ¶ 1.) On the morning of December 7, 2025, Biestman and Lee heard that ICE was

present at a church in Richfield, Minnesota, where they planned to arrest congregation

members as they left the service. (Id. ¶ 2.) Biestman and Lee drove to the church “to

observe and document ICE activity” and “to express [their] strong disapproval of such

cruel and callous behavior,

” which Lee views as her “civic obligation.” (Id.; Dkt. 1-3 (“Lee

Decl.”) ¶ 2.) Upon arriving at the church, Lee saw “fewer than a dozen” people, who

appeared to be observers. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5; see also Dkt. 14 (“Rudolph Leon Decl.”14) ¶¶ 4,

6 (stating that there were “approximately eight people at the church to observe and

document any ICE activity,” including Biestman and Lee).) Lee and Biestman also saw

ICE vehicles “driving recklessly” nearby and began to follow what they believed to be an

ICE vehicle, ensuring that they drove “carefully and lawfully” without “following too

closely” or “blocking, impeding or interfering with anyone[.]” (Biestman Decl. ¶ 3; see

Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶¶ 7–9.) They stopped at a red light, which “put some distance”

between them and the ICE vehicle. (Lee Decl. ¶ 7.)

14 Beatriz Rudolph Leon is a 25-year-old Minnesota resident who responded to calls

for community members to observe and record ICE activity at the church, which she did

“in support of [her] childhood community” and “in protest against the unlawful attacks on”

that community. (Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4–5.)

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As the couple turned into a nearby park, they “[a]lmost immediately . . . were boxed

in and stopped by four unmarked ICE vehicles.” (Biestman Decl. ¶ 4.) There were no other

people in the park. (Lee Decl. ¶ 8.) At that point, “[m]asked . . . and unmarked ICE agents

surrounded” their car,

“point[ing] semiautomatic weapons at [them] at close range,

demand[ing] that [they] roll down [their] windows, and threaten[ing] [them] multiple times

with arrest.” (Biestman Decl. ¶ 4–5; see also Lee Decl. ¶¶ 9–10.) Biestman told the agents

that he and Lee were U.S. citizens, to which the agents replied that “it didn’t matter,” and

said, “[W]hat you’re doing is illegal, this is like Germany 1938.” (Biestman Decl. ¶ 6; see

also Lee Decl. ¶ 10.)

At that point, one of the agents reached into their car through the driver-side

window, pointed at Lee, and said, “[W]e’re going to arrest her too, we have handcuffs.”

(Biestman Decl. ¶ 7.) They also told the couple that they “had to leave” immediately and

stop following the agents. (Lee Decl. ¶ 13.) When Biestman asked about an arrest warrant,

the agents said that they “didn’t need one.” (Biestman Decl. ¶ 8; see also Lee Decl. ¶ 10.)

They “continued to threaten” the couple by pointing guns “right in [their] faces” and

commenting that they had the couple’s license plate and “[knew] where to find [them]”

despite it being “readily apparent” that Lee and Biestman were unarmed. (Biestman Decl.

¶¶ 8–9.) However, the agents “did not, at any point, tell [them] what [they] had done

wrong[.]” (Lee Decl. ¶ 14.)

To Lee, the agents seemed “angry because [the couple] w[as] watching them and

because [the couple] communicated by [their] presence that [they] did not approve of [the

agents’] conduct.” (Lee Decl. ¶ 14.) Biestman and Lee were unable to record the incident

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out of fear, but Lee called another observer “so that [the observer] [could] . . . hear what

was happening.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12; Biestman Decl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Several officers recorded the

couple’s faces and license plate. (Biestman Decl. ¶ 8; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 10.)

The incident left Biestman and Lee feeling “traumatized,” anxious, and “intimidated

and terrified.” (Biestman Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 16–17.) Nevertheless, the couple

has “continued to engage in constitutional observation activities,” (Lee Decl. ¶ 17), and

plans to continue doing so “despite the agents’ threats and intimidation,” (Biestman Decl.

¶ 14). However, Lee “ha[s] been more cautious since the event” out of “fear that ICE agents

will physically harm [her].” (Lee Decl. ¶ 17.)

3. Stops of Nonparties

Evidence submitted by Plaintiffs from more than a dozen nonparties reflects that

other Minnesota residents who have followed immigration officials’ vehicles to observe

and share information about their activities have also been stopped. (E.g., Rudolph Leon

Decl.; Dkt. 1-7 (“Engelhart Decl.”); Dkt. 1-8 (“Clark Decl.”); Dkt. 1-9 (“Page Decl.”);

Dkt. 1-11 (“Kellermeyer Decl.”); Dkt. 34 (“Smith Decl.”); Dkt. 35 (“Holboy Decl.”);

Dkt. 36 (“Mielke Decl.”); Dkt. 52-3 (“Smith Decl. 2”); Dkt. 59 (“Burdine Decl.”); Dkt. 63

(“Jackson Decl.”); Dkt. 64 (“Juhn Decl.”); Dkt. 67 (“Levy Decl.”); Dkt. 69 (“Salm

Decl.”).) The declarants serve as witnesses to what Plaintiffs characterize as a broad pattern

or practice whereby federal immigration agents are stopping residents’ vehicles without

sufficient cause to justify detention. Their accounts are detailed, signed, dated, and

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provided under penalty of perjury. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The Court summarizes the common

aspects of these accounts most relevant to the issues under consideration.15

These witnesses have identified vehicles occupied by ICE agents and attempted to

follow them. (E.g., Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Page Decl. ¶ 2; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 6–7;

Kellermeyer Decl. ¶ 2.) These declarants state that while following ICE vehicles, they have

maintained a safe distance, obeyed traffic laws, and refrained from aggressive or dangerous

driving, though many of them have repeatedly honked their horns while doing so. (See,

e.g., Smith Decl. 2 ¶ 2; Mielke Decl. ¶ 5; Holboy Decl. ¶¶ 9–13; Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶ 9;

Levy Decl. ¶¶ 8, 14; Juhn Decl. ¶ 5.)

After the nonparties followed the ICE vehicles for varying distances, they were

stopped by federal immigration officers in a variety of ways. Several ICE vehicles have

boxed in or surrounded the witness’s vehicle; ICE agents have positioned their vehicles to

block the road; other times, an ICE vehicle has braked abruptly in front of the witness; and

other ICE vehicles driving behind the witness have activated emergency lights to initiate a

stop. (See, e.g., Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶ 18; Mielke Decl. ¶¶ 6–9; Smith Decl. 2 ¶¶ 2–3;

Burdine Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Levy Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.) Once stopped, ICE agents have approached the

15 Some nonparty declarants have described disturbing conduct of agents during and

after these stops, including: threatening to arrest and detain them despite knowing that they

were citizens; threatening to break the driver’s windows; waiting for the witnesses outside

their homes; following them to their homes or to an address where their vehicles are

registered; and telling the witnesses that they know where they live. (Rudolph Leon Decl.

¶¶ 24–26; Jackson Decl. ¶ 8; Levy Decl. ¶ 12; Smith Decl. 2 ¶ 4; Kellermeyer Decl. ¶ 4.)

Ms. Salm describes having her phone seized from her hands while recording agents; being

choked by the collar of her shirt; fainting twice from being lifted off the ground too quickly;

and being threatened with “a fucking bullet in [her] skull.” (Salm Decl. ¶¶ 9–23.)

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witnesses’ vehicle and accused the drivers of breaking the law by interfering with or

impeding federal agents, occasionally mentioning 18 U.S.C. § 111, and other times

providing no explanation of the laws the nonparties have purportedly violated. (E.g.,

Mielke Decl. ¶ 10; Holboy Decl. ¶ 13; Kellermeyer Decl. ¶ 5; Clark Decl. ¶ 20; Page Decl.

¶ 6.) These incidents have caused these nonparties anxiety and affected their behavior, but

they have expressed a commitment to continuing to follow and observe the actions of

federal immigration authorities in their communities. (See Rudolph Leon Decl. ¶¶ 36–38;

Page Decl. ¶¶ 10–11; Clark Decl.¶¶ 24–27; Kellermeyer Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Holboy Decl.

¶¶ 14–16; Mielke Decl. ¶ 11; Burdine Decl. ¶¶ 8–11; Levy Decl. ¶¶ 14–15; Jackson Decl.

¶ 11; Juhn Decl. ¶ 11; Salm Decl. ¶¶ 24–25.)

4. Defendants’ Response Regarding Stops

Defendants have not provided declarations or other evidence regarding the

circumstances of the stops of Plaintiffs Webb, Biestman, and Lee, nor have they provided

evidence to refute the accounts provided by the nonparty witnesses who were stopped by

immigration officers. However, in his declaration, Director Easterwood discusses the

phenomenon of Minnesota residents following government vehicles and the safety

concerns presented by such conduct:

I understand that Plaintiffs make several allegations of ICE

officers being involved in multiple confrontations with

protesters following the protesters pursuing after government

vehicles. ICE officers are trained and instructed to follow all

traffic laws. When protesters’ pursuit of government vehicles,

however, cross into erratic, aggressive driving and risk the

officers or the public’s safety, ICE officers may try to lose the

pursuing vehicle, call for assistance from local authorities, or

they may stop the pursuing vehicle and issue a warning that

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continued aggressive driving could lead to a federal arrest. In

at least one instance, local authorities arrested for harassment

one driver who followed government vehicles erratically,

thereby endangering public safety. There have also been

instances where individuals caused vehicular crashes,

endangering both ICE officers and the public’s safety, due to

erratic driving behaviors – photos of some of the damage

provided below. Sometimes people following ICE vehicles

will run red lights and cut off other vehicles in order to stay

behind ICE vehicles. In other instances, the followers use their

vehicles to block the road and to box in ICE vehicles as soon

as they are able. This behavior is not safe and impedes ICE

officers from effecting arrests. Prior to 2025, this type of

behavior was virtually nonexistent. Now, it occurs almost

daily.

(Dkt. 47 ¶ 29.)

C. Plaintiff Alan Crenshaw & December 9, 2025

Plaintiff Alan Crenshaw and other witnesses describe the use of pepper spray and

other chemical irritants in an incident in the Cedar-Riverside area on December 9, 2025.

Mr. Crenshaw and other witnesses also discuss the use of irritants in other incidents from

mid-November 2025 through January 2026.

Mr. Crenshaw is a 35-year-old Minneapolis resident. (Dkt. 1-6 (“Crenshaw Decl.

1”) ¶ 1.) On December 9, 2025, Crenshaw heard that ICE was in the Cedar Riverside area

and “that the Somali community was hoping to have people observe what the government

ha[d] been doing to their community[.]” (Id. ¶ 2.) Because it was “important for [Crenshaw]

to be able to make people aware of ICE’s presence in the neighborhood,” he walked to the

Cedar Riverside area and followed someone else who told him that ICE had just entered a

restaurant in the area. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Crenshaw planned “to document what they were doing.”

(Id. ¶ 3.)

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As Crenshaw entered the restaurant, he saw “two agents . . . violently slamming a

young black man against the wall.

” (Id. ¶ 4.) The man was “yelling in pain and saying that

he was a U.S. citizen,” but the agents “didn’t seem to care” and “dragged [the man]

outside,” even though he continued to tell them he is a citizen. (Id.) When Crenshaw and

other observers followed the agents outside, one of the agents “slammed the door on

[them]” and appeared to be “frustrated with [them] being there and filming them and telling

them that what they were doing was wrong[.]” (Id. ¶ 5.)

Once Crenshaw was outside the restaurant, he saw the agents “violently push the

young man into the snow for no apparent reason” and “put him in handcuffs” and into a

car with “black windows” and a Florida license plate. (Id. ¶ 6.) Throughout the incident,

observers “were shouting at the agents and blowing whistles,” but the agents “repeatedly

ignored requests for their badge numbers or any identifying information.” (Id. ¶ 7.) They

also ignored people who appeared to be the man’s friends or family, who showed the agents

his identification, and drove away as people “followed, recording, blowing their whistles,

and yelling.” (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) Even though “[n]o one was getting in the way of the agency cars,

which were moving slowly[,]” an agent “pepper sprayed the crowd with no warning.” (Id.

¶ 9.) Crenshaw was “about 10-15 feet away when they sprayed” and “[saw] the bright

orange” of the chemical irritant. (Id.)

After the agents left, Mr. Crenshaw “headed over to a group of people observing

other ICE activity[.]” (Id. ¶ 10.) There, he “saw about nine ICE vehicles with lights on

attempting to leave the parking lot, causing a traffic jam.” In the 20 minutes it took the

vehicles to exit the area, observers were “recording, chanting, blowing whistles, and telling

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ICE to leave.” (Id.) Crenshaw saw “multiple incidents of people being pepper sprayed with

no warning,” as well as “some agents warn[ing] people to move before spraying them.”

(Id. ¶ 10.) In one instance, agents drove slowly past, opened the car door, and “sprayed [a

bystander] directly” as the bystander “held their arms out” and “was standing on the edge

of the road.” (Id. ¶ 11.) As the bystander moved away from the car, “another agent on foot

came behind them and sprayed them directly in the face again,” before spraying “into the

small crowd.” (Id.) At that point, “[t]he crowd was really shouting,” and it appeared to

Crenshaw that the agents “seemed to deliberately want to provoke a reaction by spraying

like that.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Some observers “threw snowballs at the car wheels as it drove away,”

but Crenshaw did not. (Id.)

Then, while Mr. Crenshaw was standing “on the side of the road in the crosswalk,”

another ICE car without lights on “drove past and sprayed [him] right in the face,” leaving

him “immediately overtaken by pain,” unable to keep his eyes open, feeling unable to

breathe, and “coughing very hard[.]” (Id. ¶ 13.) Crenshaw had “red swelling,” “spots on

[his] eyes for about 24 hours,” and “skin tingling for a few hours.” (Id.) Crenshaw writes

that it is “important” to him that “the abuses that are occurring at the hands of ICE in [his]

community is documented.” (Crenshaw Decl. 1 ¶ 14.)

Other nonparty witnesses, Joe Mitchell and Mary Hackman, have provided

declarations concerning the events in the Cedar Riverside area on December 9. (Dkt. 1-14

(“Mitchell Decl.”); Dkt. 37 (“Hackman Decl.”).) Mr. Mitchell describes an ICE agent

exiting a government vehicle as a crowd of protesters followed at a distance and pepper-

sprayed the crowd, although the protesters were not within reach of the car and the vehicle

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had room to continue to drive away. (Mithcell Decl. ¶¶ 15–29.) Ms. Hackman observed

two agents jump out of a vehicle, approach two people standing nearby who were on the

sidewalk, and spray them with a chemical irritant. (Hackman Decl. ¶¶ 4–5.) She said this

occurred while nobody was “blocking any vehicles; they were just standing there,

recording, chanting, shouting, and blowing whistles.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.)

Declaration of Defendant Easterwood

Director Easterwood declares that on December 9, 2025, ICE officers were

“conducting enforcement operations” in Cedar Riverside when “protesters gathered and

began obstructing traffic and impeding government vehicle progress.” (Dkt. 47 ¶ 25.)

Easterwood states that “[p]rotesters honked their horns; blew whistles; threw snowballs,

ice, and other projectiles; kicked and hit government vehicles; and shouted insults and

obscenities at the ICE officers.” (Id.) Easterwood declares that officers “issued multiple

verbal commands” as well as those “over the public address system” directing protesters

“to move back or ICE officers would have to resort to the use of chemical munitions if

protesters continued to impede vehicular traffic.” (Id.) Easterwood states that “[p]rotesters

refused to comply,” so officers “deployed [pepper] sprays to disperse the crowd blocking

the street” so they could advance. (Id.) Easterwood further states: “As a tactic to deter

further aggression and advancement from protesters, ICE officers kept their [pepper]

sprayers aimed at the crowds.” (Id.) Following the hearing, Defendants supplemented the

record, under seal, with the ICE incident report that formed the basis for Easterwood’s

Declaration concerning the events of December 9, 2025. (Dkt. 78 at 3; Dkt. 79-2.) The

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incident report does not add any significant additional detail to the record regarding the

specific deployment of a chemical irritant that was sprayed in Crenshaw’s face.

D. Other Incidents

Plaintiffs present evidence concerning other interactions between observers and

protesters and federal immigration authorities from mid-November 2025 through January

2026. Witnesses to these encounters describe agents’ use of chemical irritants and other

force in a variety of circumstances. The Court provides a summary of the record evidence

below.

16

1. ICE Activity at Bro-Tex

Moriah O’Malley

On November 18, 2025, Minneapolis resident Moriah O’Malley heard of

immigration enforcement by federal agencies at Bro-Tex, a business in Saint Paul, and

decided to join other protesters and observers. (Dkt. 1-13 (“O’Malley Decl.”) ¶ 2.) At Bro-

Tex, O’Malley saw a large group of protesters and federal agents from a variety of

agencies. (Id. ¶ 3.) As the agents, who were “mostly in plainclothes with vests identifying

their agencies,” hats, and face coverings, were preparing to leave with detained people in

their cars, the situation “started to escalate[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.) Agents began to “throw people

to the ground, shoot pepper balls, and use pepper spray and tear gas,” without warning,

16 Another nonparty witness, Carla Hennes of Minnetonka, describes her

observations of ICE activity at a library on December 29, 2025. (Dkt. 33 (“Hennes Decl”)

¶ 1.) Hennes was blowing a whistle as several agents entered the building, and merely

standing near the entrance, “an agent came up, grabbed [her] by the back of the head, and

shoved [her] so hard that [her] glasses came off.

” (Id. ¶¶ 9–11.)

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“sometimes to get the people to move, and sometimes for what seemed like no reason at

all.” (Id. ¶ 5.) While O’Malley, who “was filming a silver Dodge Charger,” had “turn[ed]

to focus on other things behind [her],” the car came towards her without any lights or sirens

on and without honking or yelling for her to move. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to O’Malley, the

car “rammed right into” her, “knocking [her] to the ground” and leaving her “shocked.”

(Id.) After she got up, she “filmed the same car hitting another person and knocking them

to the ground.” (Id. ¶ 7.) O’Malley “ran up to the window of the car to try to get a shot of

[the driver’s] face” and “yell[ed] that he had just hit people with his car.” (Id.)

Declaration of Defendant Easterwood

According to Director Easterwood, federal law enforcement officials “serving a

federal search warrant” at Bro-Tex were met with “significant protester presence

attempting to disrupt” them. (Easterwood Decl. ¶ 22.) “A crowd of approximately two

hundred protesters yelled obscenities at the federal officials; violently pushed, hit, threw

objects at, and body slammed into the officials; obstructed the path of government vehicles;

and caused property damage to at least seven government vehicles.” (Id.) Federal officials

advised protesters on “numerous occasions to move back and stop blocking traffic, [but]

protesters refused to comply and even intruded past secured perimeters marked with police

caution tape.” (Id.) Federal officials attempted to “attempted to physically push protesters

back” because both the officials’ and the public’s safety was at risk. (Id.) When this failed

to create a clearing, the officers “deployed non-lethal munitions” to disperse the ground

and make a path for their vehicles. (Id.) The operation and the events that followed resulted

in the arrest of 13 undocumented aliens and one protester. (Id.) Easterwood also attaches

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three photos of the events with one showing a group of protesters standing in front of a

vehicle, one of a protester appearing to kick a vehicle, and one of an agent appearing to

throw a protester to the ground. (Dkt. 47 at 8–9.)

Video

Video of the incident from a news report shows a crowd of protesters around federal

agents with crime scene tape on the ground. (Bro-Tex Video17 0:50–0:52.) Protesters can

be seen interlinking arms to create what the report called “a human blockade.” (Bro-Tex

Video 0:48–0:50, 1:01–1:06.) Agents can be seen pushing protesters part of this blockade.

(Bro-Tex Video 1:01–1:06.) Agents face-to-face with protesters can also be seen pepper

spraying the crowd. (Bro-Tex Video 0:53–0:57.) At some point a peaceful crowd of

protesters can be seen talking face-to-face with agents and recording them. (Bro-Tex Video

1:21–1:26.)

2. Pepper Spray Deployment

Several witnesses describe apparently gratuitous deployment of pepper spray at

observers and protesters on separate occasions in December 2025 and January 2026. On

December 10, 2025, Riley Kellermeyer was observing ICE operations in the Cedar

Riverside neighborhood, she saw agents “pepper spray a man full in the face who was

simply standing on the road as they drove past [him].” (Kellermeyer Decl. ¶¶ 8–9.) That

same day, after Dan Engelhart had earlier been stopped and then mocked by ICE agents he

17 Kare 11, Family members speak out after federal action in St. Paul, Facebook

(Nov. 18, 2025), https://www.facebook.com/KARE11/videos/family-members-speak-out-

after-federal-action-in-stpaul/25653503927587560/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2026) (“Bro-Tex

Video”) (cited at Dkt. 47 at 8 n.6.)

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was following in his vehicle, he witnesses his Somali-American friend, Bihi, get sprayed

directly in the face with a chemical irritant by agents in an SUV that was driving past him.

(Engelhart Decl. ¶¶ 5–10.)

On January 6, 2026, Claire Smith and her neighbor saw an ICE agent spray chemical

irritants “directly into the window” of an observer car that had been following it as it passed

by the ICE vehicle. (Smith Decl. 2 ¶ 5.) On January 9, 2026, Richfield resident Troy

Carrillo had just gotten out of his car to record an ICE officer in Bloomington when a

vehicle that he recognized from an earlier ICE observation “zoomed up next to” him.

(Dkt. 60 (“Carrillo Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 8.) “An agent jumped out and said, ‘Back the fuck up,

you’re impeding,’” to which Carrillo said, “No, you back the fuck up I’m walking away.”

(Id. ¶ 8.) The agent then sprayed a chemical irritant into Carrillo’s eyes. (Id.) When Carrillo

looked up, he was sprayed again “right in the eyes” and “couldn’t see anything.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

The interaction left his eyes and face “swollen” and “irritated,” preventing him from going

out again, but Carrillo thinks that he “will probably be out there soon.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

3. ICE Activity at Roosevelt High School

There are several declarations in the record concerning events that unfolded at

Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis on January 7, 2026, including a second declaration

from Plaintiff Alan Crenshaw.

18 Mr. Crenshaw has continued to observe ICE after the

18 Tensions in the Twin Cities between federal immigration authorities and

protesters have increased since January 7, 2026, following the shooting in South

Minneapolis of Renee Macklin Good by an ICE agent. This case does not involve any

claims directly related to that shooting, but the Court mentions it here because it is an

incident of wide notoriety and is part of the broader context for the events in this case.

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December 9, 2025 incident in Cedar Riverside. (Dkt. 53-2 (“Crenshaw Decl. 2”) ¶ 1). On

January 7, 2026, Crenshaw and his friend drove to Roosevelt High School after being

alerted to “significant ICE presence” that warranted observation. (Id. ¶ 2.) Because of

traffic, Crenshaw exited the car and began recording. (Id. ¶ 3.) There were “[s]everal cars

. . . in the middle of the road” in what appeared to be an accident, and “[a] large crowd was

already there.” (Id.) Crenshaw saw “that about 6 or 7 agents had taken a young man down

to the ground . . . [and] in a car.” (Id. ¶ 4.) For several minutes, the agents “just stood around

facing the crowd, sort of menacing them,” as the crowd “yell[ed] a lot,” “bl[ew] whistles,

“call[ed] [the] agents murderers and t[old] them to leave.” (Id. ¶ 4–5.)

As some of the cars began to leave, the agents threw two women, who were

“standing in the crosswalk, recording and observing,

” over to the side of the road and into

other observers. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to Crenshaw, the agents “seemed comfortable just

shoving people out of the way.” (Id. ¶ 9.) At that point, someone suddenly “r[an] across

the street” and was followed by agents who “chased them back onto school grounds,”

“body-slammed them to the ground,” and “sat on the person[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) While the

crowd was yelling, Crenshaw saw “some snow fly through the air,” at which point an agent

“shot off some chemical irritant into the crowd” using a “weapon [that] looked something

like a paintball gun.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Crenshaw “could taste the spray in the air.” (Id.)

As “[o]ther agents came up and shoved the protesters and observers out of the way,”

Crenshaw saw agents “pull[] . . . down” another person for “[getting] too close[.]” (Id. ¶ 8.)

He “think[s] [the agents] sprayed her in the face with a chemical irritant because when they

stood her up and walked her to the car, she had it on her face and it looked like she was in

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pain.” (Id.) According to Crenshaw, the agents—who “were dressed differently, in fatigues

and camo and helmets” and “were decked out in more gear and had bigger weapons”—

appeared to be “even more aggressive, more violent, more cavalier about things than the

ones [he had] seen before.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Crenshaw intends to “continue to observe when [he]

can.” (Id. ¶ 10.)

Others who were at Roosevelt High School to protest ICE’s presence there provided

declarations. Christopher Lee Beal describes seeing “ICE agents indiscriminately pushing,

shoving, and throwing legal observers to the ground as a show of force and intimidation,

”

“brandish[ing] their weapons and point[ing] them toward a crowd,” and “fir[ing] chemical

irritants, which appeared to be pepper rounds, into the ground in front of the crowd.”

(Dkt. 58 (“Beale Decl.”) ¶ 5.) As the ICE agents were leaving, Beal “saw several

individuals running alongside the agents without trying to block or impede their exit,” but

“an ICE agent violently grabbed a woman by the neck or shoulder and threw her to the

ground.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Similarly, Minneapolis resident Kristen Koerth went to the school to

protest and saw agents chasing and pushing protesters, including at least one person who

appeared to be a high schooler, and deploy pepper spray into the crowd. (Dkt. 65 (“Koerth

Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–10.)

Ann Kreitman also went to the school to observe ICE activities and saw officers

throw a peaceful observer face first into the snow. (Dkt. 66 (“Kreitman Decl.”) ¶¶4–7.)

Kreitman witnessed an woman who had been recording with her phone having her arm

grabbed and held by an ICE agent and then shoved roughly into a snowbank even though

the woman “had not been doing anything violent or aggressive toward” the agent. (Id. ¶¶ 8–

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10.) And Ms. Kreitman saw ICE agents “indiscriminately” pepper spraying crowds that

were standing on sidewalks shouting, even though they had not behaved violently or

aggressively. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.)

Finally, Minneapolis resident Hallie Patterson describes what she observed at

Roosevelt High School. (Dkt. 68 (“Patterson Decl.”).) Ms. Patterson arrived and saw a

nonviolent crowd of around 100 people, and despite their peaceful demonstrations,

immigration officers “shov[ed]” people and “fired teargas canisters into the crowd,”

seemingly to “disperse it and prevent people from” further demonstrations. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5.)

4. Protests Outside Whipple Federal Building

Another location where protesters and federal immigration authorities have clashed

is near the Bishop Henry Whipple Building in Minneapolis where detainees are held and

immigration court proceedings take place. Nonparty witnesses Theresa Del Rosario and

Thomas Ett describe events that unfolded there on January 8, 2026. (Dkt. 61 (“Del Rosario

Decl.”); Dkt. 62 (“Ett Decl.”).) According to Mr. Ett, other than “one protestor throw[ing]

a single snowball,” nobody took “any threatening action against the agents” that Ett

observed. (Ett Decl. ¶ 3.) As vehicles were entering the Whipple building, agents began

“pushing the protestors using chemical spray” without any warning, which made it hard

for Del Rosario and Ett to breathe, and “shoving people to make room[.]” (Id. ¶ 5; Del

Rosario Decl. ¶ 8.) At some point, Del Rosario and Ett “[felt] too intimidated to stay,” even

in nearby public spaces. (Del Rosario Decl. ¶ 12.) As they tried to leave, the agents herded

“40 to 50 people” into a space that was only big enough “for two or three to get through at

a time.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Ett was “shoved repeatedly” (Ett Decl. ¶ 6), and Del Rosario, who uses

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a walking cane, was shoved “very hard” by an agent, which caused her to stumble (Del

Rosario Decl. ¶¶ 1, 14). The agents’ use of force seemed “unnecessary” and

“disproportionate” to Mr. Ett, given that the protesters “were attempting to leave as

instructed.” (Ett Decl. ¶¶ 6–7.) Del Rosario and Ett have experienced health issues since

the incident, but they plan to continue protesting. (Id. ¶ 8; Del Rosario Decl. ¶ 17.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy[.]” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Its purpose “is to preserve the status quo until, upon

final hearing, a court may grant full, effective relief.” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 103 F.4th

1336, 1342 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d

589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984)). The status quo is “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status

which preceded the pending controversy.” N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer

Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 120

(2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)); see also Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Meter for & on Behalf of

N.L.R.B., 385 F.2d 265, 273 (8th Cir. 1967); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d

355, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is sometimes necessary to require a party who has recently

disturbed the status quo to reverse its actions” because “such an injunction restores, rather

than disturbs, the status quo ante.

”) (cleaned up).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, “[t]he court may issue a preliminary

injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). As such, “the rule

‘implies a hearing in which the defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the

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application [for a preliminary injunction] and to prepare for such opposition.’” Tumey v.

Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 665 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.

Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423, 432

n.7 (1974)). A district court has “broad discretion” in determining whether to issue a

preliminary injunction. Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2000)

(quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998)).

In the Eighth Circuit, a party seeking to obtain a preliminary injunction must

demonstrate that the Dataphase factors favor injunctive relief. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v.

C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). These factors include: (1) likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the movant without injunctive relief; (3) a

balance of the equities; and (4) the public interest. Tumey, 27 F.4th at 664 (quoting Winter,

555 U.S. at 20 (2008), and citing Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114). In applying these factors, a

court must “flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances to determine whether the

balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to

preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co.,

140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). The party seeking relief bears the

burden of showing that a preliminary injunction is needed. Lindell v. United States, 82

F.4th 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2023).

While no single factor is determinative, the likelihood of success on the merits is

considered the “most important.” Jet Midwest Int’l Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Gr., LLC, 953

F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648

F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011)). To meet its burden on this factor, the moving party must

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show a “fair chance of prevailing, . . . but it need not show that it has a greater than fifty

per cent likelihood of success[.]” Sleep Number Corp. v. Young, 33 F.4th 1012, 1016–17

(8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see also Wilbur-Ellis Co., LLC v. Jens, 139 F.4th 608, 611

(8th Cir. 2025) (same).

A showing of irreparable harm is also necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction.

See Choreo, LLC v. Lors, No. 25-1706, 2026 WL 82841, at *3 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026)

(explaining that a movant’s failure to show irreparable harm is “an independently sufficient

basis” to deny a preliminary injunction) (quotation omitted). “Irreparable harm occurs

when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully

compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC,

563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). To satisfy this factor, “a party must show that the harm

is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for

equitable relief.” Morehouse Enters., LLC v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives, 78 F.4th 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2023). But this does not mean that the alleged

harm must be “occurring or be certain to occur before a court may grant relief.”

Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’

rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1037

(8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 788 (7th

Cir. 2011)). When the government is the party opposing a preliminary-injunction motion,

the balance-of-harms and public-interest factors merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,

435 (2009); Eggers v. Evnen, 48 F.4th 561, 564–65 (8th Cir. 2022).

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II. Evidentiary Considerations

Before turning to questions of standing and the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a

preliminary injunction, the Court addresses the weight that should be given to the evidence.

The Court notes that it instructed the parties to request an evidentiary hearing if they

believed it was necessary, but did not receive such a request from either party. Therefore

the evidentiary record consists primarily of affidavits and declarations which courts

frequently rely upon when ruling on requests for preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g.,

Reg’l Multiple Listing Serv. of Minn., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 960 F. Supp.

2d 988, 993 n.3 (D. Minn. 2013) (citing Movie Sys., Inc. v. MAD Minneapolis Audio

Distribs., 717 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1983)). There are also videos and unsworn sealed

police reports in the record.

The Court has carefully considered how to weigh the various components of the

record before it. See 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2949 (3d ed. Sept. 2025 update) (“[T]he question of how much weight an

affidavit will be given is left to the trial court’s discretion and the quality of the affidavit

will have a significant effect on this determination[.]”); Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen

Task Force v. Montana, 98 F.4th 1180, 1193 n.16 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that the

“weight of the evidence . . . is left to the trial court’s discretion”) (citing Wright & Miller,

at § 2949). And, in doing so, the Court is mindful that the Federal Rules of Evidence do

not apply with full force in this context. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc.,

736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “the rules of evidence do not apply

strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings” given their “urgency” and the “limited

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factual development” at that stage); Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718

(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)) (considering

evidence that otherwise may be excluded, including evidence based on “multiple levels of

hearsay” and “not based solely on personal knowledge,

” because the preliminary-

injunction procedure is “less formal” and evidence may be “less complete” than at trial);

see also Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2nd Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).

At the same time, evidence that does not meet admissibility standards may be given less

weight. See id. (“The admissibility of hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence goes to

weight, not preclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage.”).

Applying those principles here, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ declarations are

entitled to substantial weight. Each named plaintiff has submitted at least one declaration

based largely on their personal experiences and knowledge. Each of these declarations was

sworn under penalty of perjury. Plaintiffs’ descriptions of their own conduct, the conduct

of federal immigration officers, and the circumstances in which the relevant conduct

occurred provide essential context for evaluating Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Court credits

their accounts.

By contrast, Defendants did not provide sworn declarations from immigration

officers (or others) who witnessed or were themselves directly involved in the conduct

challenged by Plaintiffs. Rather, in opposing Plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing, Defendants

elected to rely primarily on the declaration of Defendant David Easterwood, who is the

Acting Field Office Director for the ICE Saint Paul Field Office. While Director

Easterwood’s declaration is made under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,

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he does not aver that he was present when any of the plaintiffs were observing or protesting

ICE activities and instead provides the following explanation for the basis of his declaration

testimony:

The statements contained in this declaration are based upon my

personal knowledge, reasonable inquiry, and information made

available to me in the course of my official duties from

information obtained from records, systems, databases, other

DHS employees, and/or information portals maintained and

relied upon by DHS.

(Easterwood Decl. ¶ 7.) As his declaration makes clear, Easterwood’s personal knowledge

is not derived from firsthand observations, but from conversations with other DHS

personnel, reviews of their written accounts, and review of unspecified information

maintained by DHS.

As to substance, Director Easterwood’s declaration offers a partial counter-factual

narrative of the events leading up to the arrests of Tincher and Noor (id. ¶¶ 24, 27), and a

more generalized discussion of the December 9, 2025 encounter between protesters and

ICE officers during which Crenshaw was sprayed with a chemical irritant (id. ¶ 25).19 As

described more fully below, the Court concludes that Easterwood’s accounts of what

occurred with respect to Plaintiffs Tincher, Noor, and Crenshaw are entitled to

considerably less weight than Plaintiffs’ declarations.

19 Director Easterwood does not provide any specific discussion of the traffic stops

of Lee, Biestman, Webb, or any of the declarants who describe such stops. Instead, he

discussed the following of ICE officers by protesters and the stopping of those vehicles by

officers over the last several weeks generally.

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Moreover, Defendants’ supplementation of the record does not cure the imbalance.

Following the motion hearing, the Court instructed the parties to supplement the record

with any video evidence in their possession. Defendants asserted that they were unable to

locate relevant video evidence as to the claims of Plaintiffs Tincher, Lee, Biestman, and

Webb, but submitted videos relevant to Plaintiffs Noor and Crenshaw’s claims. However,

after close review, the Court concludes that the supplementary videos do not provide

meaningful evidentiary support for Defendants’ position regarding the incidents involving

either Noor or Crenshaw.

Defendants also provided incident reports prepared by DHS personnel concerning

Tincher’s December 9, 2025 arrest; Noor’s December 15, 2025 arrest; and the use of

chemical irritants on Crenshaw from December 9, 2025. Although the reports reflect the

basis for the statements in Director Easterwood’s declaration, the Court finds that they are

not entitled to the same weight as the declarations provided by Plaintiffs. Most notably, all

of the declarations in support of Plaintiffs’ motion, including those submitted by non-

parties, are made under penalty of perjury in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and

therefore carry considerable weight. By contrast, the few narrative reports submitted by

Defendants, and relied upon by Director Easterwood in his declaration, are not sworn or

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made under penalty of perjury.20 See, e.g., Hudson v. Preckwinkle, No. 13 C 8752, 2015

WL 1541787, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2015) (noting that the court “finds little reason

to afford any significant weight to . . . unsworn and unauthenticated statements” in the

preliminary-injunction context).

In short, what we have in this record is a qualitative imbalance. To be clear, the

Court does not exclude or disregard any evidence submitted by Defendants, including any

of Director Easterwood’s averments or the supplemental evidence submitted by

Defendants after the hearing. It may ultimately be that Defendants could persuade a

factfinder through admissible evidence that their version of events is more believable, but

that issue is not before the Court now, and Plaintiffs are not required, at this stage, to clear

the hurdle of proving a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims beyond a “fair

chance” of doing so. Sleep Number Corp., 33 F.4th at 1016.

III. Standing

The Court must consider standing before turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion

for injunctive relief. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an

injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)

20 The Court recognizes that the record on this motion was submitted on an

expedited basis. However, at the initial scheduling conference, the Court granted

Defendants’ request for additional time specifically so that they could meaningfully

respond to the evidentiary materials Plaintiffs submitted. And, if Defendants chose to

provide only summary hearsay due to safety concerns for individual agents involved in

Operation Metro Surge, as claimed in Director Easterwood’s declaration, the Court notes

that they could have sought a protective order, asked to proceed under pseudonym, or filed

the declarations under seal. The Court would have granted such relief. They did none of

those things.

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that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

U.S. 330, 338. Specifically, an injury in fact must be both “concrete and particularized,”

and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quotation omitted). In evaluating standing at the preliminary-

injunction stage, a court takes the moving party’s allegations as true and view those

allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Dakotans for Health v.

Noem, 52 F.4th 381, 386 (8th Cir. 2022); see id. at 386 (considering a declaration and sworn

testimony, in addition to the complaint, in analyzing standing). Those allegations must

make a “clear showing” at this stage that Plaintiffs are “likely to establish each element of

standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024) (quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs must specifically “demonstrate they have standing for each claim they

bring and for each form of relief they seek.” Webb ex rel. K. S. v. Smith, 936 F.3d 808, 814

(8th Cir. 20190. When injunctive relief is sought, allegations of past injuries alone are

insufficient to establish standing, and a plaintiff must show “an ongoing injury or . . . an

immediate threat of injury.” Frost v. Sioux City, 920 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2019)

(quotation omitted). For the latter, “a person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue

forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as

the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594

U.S. 413, 435 (2021); see FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024)

(defining this requirement as “meaning that the injury must have already occurred or be

likely to occur soon”). But if the risk of harm is too speculative, there is no Article III

standing. Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 94 F.4th 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2024).

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Although future risk is required, past events remain relevant to the standing inquiry.

Indeed, past injuries can support injunctive relief if they are accompanied by “any

continuing, present adverse effects,” See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974).

Similarly, “[p]ast wrongs [are] evidence bearing on ‘whether there is a real and immediate

threat of repeated injury.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quoting

O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496); cf. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014)

(stating that “good evidence” of a threat of future enforcement is “past enforcement against

the same conduct”); Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-cv-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2021

WL 3222495, at *5 (D. Minn. July 29, 2021) (citing Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S.

Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A recurring-injury case . . . is not

speculative when actual repeated incidents are documented.”); see 303 Creative LLC v.

Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 583 (2023) (agreeing that the plaintiff had established a “credible

threat” of enforcement where the state had “a history of past enforcement against nearly

identical conduct”).

A. Standing for First Amendment Claims

“The First Amendment standing inquiry is lenient and forgiving.

” GLBT Youth in

Iowa Schs. Task Force v. Reynolds, 114 F.4th 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted)

(stating that when “threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the

. . . inquiry tilts dramatically toward a finding of standing” (cleaned up)).

21 Specifically,

21 The Court notes that Plaintiffs have met their burden to assert viable First

Amendment claims even under a traditional standing analysis applicable to parties seeking

injunctive relief. But the issue is all the more clear given the First Amendment nature of

many of their claims.

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“[t]his leniency manifests itself most commonly in” the injury-in-fact element. Dakotans

for Health, 52 F.4th at 386 (quotation omitted).

“In the First Amendment context, two types of injuries may confer Article III

standing to seek prospective relief.

” Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830

F.3d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Most relevant here is the existence of a

“credible threat of prosecution” under a challenged law. Id. (quotation omitted). A person

“facing a credible threat of future prosecution suffers from an ongoing injury from the . . .

chilling effect on [their] desire to exercise [their] First Amendment rights.

” Id. (quoting

Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003)). However, this requires “present[ing]

more than allegations of a subjective chill” and “alleg[ing] a ‘specific present objective

harm or a threat of specific future harm[.]’” Miller v. City of St. Paul, 823 F.3d 503, 506

(8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege they have been subject to a variety of retaliatory behavior by

Defendants, including traffic stops, arrests, the indiscriminate use of chemical irritants, and

pointing of firearms. These kinds of conduct are those that undoubtedly give rise to an

objective chill of First Amendment rights. See Section IV.A.2 (citing Garcia v. City of

Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2003); Watson v. Boyd, 119 F.4th 539, 557 (8th

Cir. 2024); Laney v City of St. Louis, 56 F.4th 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2023)). And the record

before the Court demonstrates that the threat of future enforcement is both real and non-

speculative. Indeed, it is ongoing. Plaintiffs each submitted a declaration describing how

they engaged in different forms of protected First Amendment activity and were

subsequently subjected to law enforcement conduct that objectively chills that activity.

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Additionally, Plaintiffs have established an ongoing, persistent pattern of

Defendants’ chilling conduct. The dozens of declarations by similarly situated nonparties

detail similar, if not more egregious, injuries to rights suffered at the hands of federal law

enforcement officers for engaging in protected activity.

22 And although the Court is

resisting relying broadly on media reports of recent developments, it cannot ignore the

almost-nonstop press reporting of continuing protest activity met with continuing

aggressive responses by immigration officers operating in the Twin Cities. Taken as a

whole, the record adequately illustrates that Defendants have made, and will continue to

make, a common practice of conduct that chills observers’ and protesters’ First

Amendment rights. See Index Newspapers LLC, 977 F.3d at 826 (concluding that the “risk

of future injury [was] not speculative” where plaintiffs “introduced powerful evidence of

the Federal Defendants’ ongoing, sustained pattern of conduct that resulted in numerous

injuries” to those exercising their First Amendment rights); Goyette, 2021 WL 3222495, at

*5 (finding an imminent risk of future injury under similar circumstances). Here, as in

Samaha v. City of Minneapolis, Plaintiffs “have plausibly alleged that [federal] officers

violate[] their constitutional rights . . . pursuant to an unofficial custom of using excessive

22 Defendants contend that the Court should give these declarations no weight

because they are irrelevant to the standing analysis. But “the experience of other journalists,

legal observers, and protesters bears directly on the operative question of whether Plaintiffs

‘will again be wronged in a similar way.

’” Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, No. 25 C

12173, 2025 WL 3240782, at *73 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025) (quoting Los Angeles Press

Club v. Noem, 799 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2025). Moreover, the consistency of

the facts alleged across a variety of incidents, dates, and neighborhoods, adds credibility to

the Plaintiffs’ own declarations.

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force against peaceful protesters,” and that they “will peacefully protest in [Minnesota] in

the future.” 525 F. Supp. 3d 933, 645 (D. Minn. 2021).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established standing

to support much of the relief they seek, and the relief the Court awards, at this stage.

23

B. Standing for Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs Biestman, Lee, and Webb, who each alleged that they have been stopped

and questioned by the federal law enforcement agents they followed, also have standing to

bring their Fourth Amendment claims.

There is no dispute that these Plaintiffs were seized under the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A traffic stop constitutes

a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) Moreover, as explored below,

the Court finds those seizures to be unlawful. And for substantially similar reasons to those

stated above, the Court finds persuasive Plaintiffs’ allegations in the record about the risk

of future seizure being “sufficiently imminent and substantial.

” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

435. Of the 34 declarations filed by Plaintiffs, 15 attest to nearly an identical set of

circumstances: the declarant was driving their car lawfully; the declarant was following

federal law enforcement agents at a safe distance to observe the agents’ activity; and the

23 The Court is mindful that injunctive relief was stayed on appeal in a recent similar

case. Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, No. 25-3023, Dkt. 28 (Stay Order) (7th Cir. Nov.

19, 2025). However, in that case, the stay was based in part on the observation that the

enforcement surge in Chicago had come to an end by the time of the appeal. Stay Order at

2 (“And we are aware of public reporting suggesting that the enhanced immigration

enforcement initiative may have lessened or ceased, which could affect both the

justiciability of this case and the propriety of injunctive relief.

”).

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agents initiated a traffic stop of the declarants. The consistent recurrence of incidents that

are similar in all relevant respects illustrates an “ongoing, sustained pattern of conduct,”

Index Newspapers LLC, 977 F.3d at 826, where federal law enforcement officers are

initiating traffic stops of anyone they suspect to be following them. And, again, because

Biestman, Lee, and Webb each declare that they will continue to observe and follow federal

agents (Biestman Decl. ¶ 14; Lee Decl. ¶ 17; Webb Decl. ¶ 12), it is not merely speculative

that they will be seized again.

Relying primarily on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Defendants

argue that the incidents of past conduct described by Plaintiffs are insufficient to establish

an ongoing or imminent harm in the Fourth Amendment context. There, the plaintiff was

placed in a chokehold during a traffic stop. Id. at 97–98. The court concluded that the

plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he could not establish a risk of

being subjected to such conduct again. The Court explained that he would have had to

assert that “all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they

happen to have an encounter,” or “that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act

in such a manner.” Id. at 106. But Lyons is distinguishable for two reasons. First, unlike the

plaintiff’s single allegation of the challenged conduct, the record here contains at least 15

instances of the conduct at issue. The numerosity of the incidents strongly suggests that

these Plaintiffs in fact face a substantial risk future harm that warrants injunctive relief.

Second, in Lyons, the plaintiff’s risk of being put in a future chokehold was

predicated on him being subjected to another traffic stop, which would require assuming

that he would break the law again. See id. at 103, 106. But here, Biestman, Lee, and Webb

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were harmed while engaging in solely lawful conduct. See Chicago Headline Club v. Noem,

No. 25 C 12173, 2025 WL 3240782, at *73 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Unlike in Lyons,

where the plaintiff could avoid being choked by conducting his activities within the law,

thus avoiding exposure to future injury, Plaintiffs cannot avoid injury as they are being

threatened and harmed for acting firmly within the law and exercising their First

Amendment rights.”); see also Los Angeles Press Club v. Noem, 799 F. Supp. 3d 1036,

1060 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (distinguishing Lyons on similar grounds). And most critically here,

each named Plaintiff has declared an intention to continue protesting, observing, and

following ICE, meaning the likelihood of a future traffic stop is much higher than the

speculative risk of a future chokehold in Lyons.

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument and concludes that Plaintiffs

Biestman, Lee, and Webb have established standing on their Fourth Amendment claims.

IV. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Next, the Court addresses whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to show a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Specifically, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs Tincher and Noor have met this burden as to their claim that they were arrested

in retaliation for their protected First Amendment activity, and Plaintiff Crenshaw has also

met his burden on his claim regarding the use of chemical irritants in retaliation for

engaging in protected activity. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs Lee, Biestman, and

Webb have shown a likelihood of success on their claims that ICE officers violated their

Fourth Amendment rights by stopping them without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of

criminal activity.

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A. First Amendment Retaliation

The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Those protections “prohibit[] government officials from

subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v.

Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).

“If an official takes adverse action against someone based on that forbidden motive, and

non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences, the

injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a First Amendment claim.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim must establish three

elements: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the government took adverse

action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of

the protected activity.” Wolk v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 107 F.4th 854, 859–60 (8th Cir.

2024). Each is discussed in turn.

1. Protected Activity

Here, Plaintiffs assert that they engaged in the following protected activity:

assembling in public to protest ICE actions and activity; observing ICE officers who are

engaged in their official duties in public, including by following ICE vehicles; and

recording and disseminating videos of ICE agents they observe. (Dkt. 18 at 16–23.) While

Defendants do not dispute that expressing disapproval of ICE operations is protected

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speech, they challenge whether Plaintiffs’ specific actions of observing, recording, and

following ICE officers in the performance of their duties are protected by the First

Amendment. (See Dkt. 46 at 13, 30.)

Relying on Molina v. City of St. Louis, 59 F.4th 344 (8th Cir. 2023), Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims must fail because the First Amendment does not

protect a right to observe law enforcement officers, which it is not inherently expressive

conduct. (See Dkt. 46 at 37–38.) But Molina does not control the outcome here. In Molina,

the defendants appealed from a denial of qualified immunity to individual officers at the

summary-judgment stage. 59 F.4th at 337. Under that framework, which required the

plaintiff to establish that defendants had violated a “clearly established” right, the Eighth

Circuit held that, in 2015, there was no clearly established First Amendment right to

observe the police. Id. at 340. Whether a right was clearly established is a separate inquiry

from whether a right is constitutionally protected. Therefore, the Court disagrees that

Molina forecloses the conclusion that there now exists a First Amendment right to observe

and record law enforcement officers. See id. at 340 n.2 (“It is not beyond the realm of

possibility that a First Amendment right to observe police exists[.]”)

Instead, for several reasons, the Court concludes that the First Amendment protects

the right to peacefully observe government officials, including law enforcement officers,

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who are engaged in their official duties in public.24 First, several Eighth Circuit decisions

support the existence of such a right.25 See Ness v. City of Bloomington, 11 F.4th 914, 923

(8th Cir. 2021) (“The acts of taking photographs and recording videos are entitled to First

Amendment protection because they are an important stage of the speech process that ends

with the dissemination of information about a public controversy.”); see also Hoyland v.

McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 656 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that plaintiff had no

24 At this time, the Court does not find that following law enforcement vehicles is

protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have largely treated this question as

coextensive with the issue of whether there is a right to observe and record. But none of

the caselaw the Court has found clearly supports such a conclusion, and the Court is not

prepared to explore this important, complex issue on the expedited provisional briefing

before it. However, the Court holds, below, that peacefully and safely following

immigration officers performing their duties in public, without more, does not provide a

lawful basis for an investigative traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.

25 Although the majority in Molina questioned whether observing law enforcement

officers in public could be inherently expressive conduct entitled to protection under the

First Amendment, 59 F.4th at 340 n.2, other courts have recognized such a right

independent of any question of inherently expressive qualities because “[t]he First

Amendment protects the public’s right of access to information about their officials’ public

activities[.]” Fields v. Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding it

unnecessary to decide whether the act of recording is “inherently expressive conduct”).

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right to observe a traffic stop), abrogated in part on other grounds by Nieves v. Bartlett,

587 U.S. 391 (2019)).

26

Moreover, this Court notes that every other Court of Appeals to have considered the

issue has found that the First Amendment protects a right to peacefully observe and/or

record law enforcement officers who are engaged in their official duties in public. Fields,

862 F.3d 353, 360 (“In sum, under the First Amendment’s right of access to information

the public has the commensurate right to record—photograph, film, or audio record—

police officers conducting official police activity in public areas.”); see also Turner v.

Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7–8

(1st Cir. 2014); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v.

City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); Irizarry v. Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 1289 (10th Cir.

2022). The reasoning reflected in these decisions echoes that in Ness upholding a First

26 See also Chestnut v. Wallace, 947 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2020); Walker v. City of

Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2005). The Molina court characterized Chestnut and

Walker as cases concerned only with the scope of Fourth Amendment protections that did

not clearly establish the existence of a First Amendment right to observe police. Molina,

59 F.4th at 339–40. But both Chestnut and Walker held that the Constitution protects an

individual’s right to observe law enforcement. Chestnut, 947 F.3d at 1090–91 (stating that

“Walker establishes that [the defendant] violated [plaintiff’s] clearly established right to

watch police-citizen interactions at a distance and without interfering”); Walker, 414 F.3d

at 992–93 (explaining that the rights of “a citizen who . . . stood at a considerable distance

from police officers engaged in a conversation with [citizens], who spoke only when

spoken to, and who complied with [the officer’s] request for identification after pointing

out that he had done nothing wrong” were violated when he was arrested). Although

Chestnut and Walker did not clearly establish a First Amendment right to observe law

enforcement, they relied on cases from several circuit courts that did so. See, e.g., Chestnut,

947 F.3d at 1090–91 (citing First Amendment cases from the Eighth, First, Third, Seventh,

Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits).

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Amendment right to record and disseminate media “on matters of public controversy.” 11

F.4th 923. And they underscore the reality that, for the First Amendment’s protection of

“actual photos, videos, and recordings . . . to have meaning[,] [it] must also protect the act

of creating that material” because “[t]here is no practical difference between allowing

police to prevent people from taking recordings and actually banning the possession or

distribution of them.” Fields, 862 F.2d at 358 (citation omitted); see Alvarez, 679 F.3d at

595 (“The act of making a[] . . . recording is necessarily included within the First

Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate

the resulting recording.” (emphasis omitted)).

Finally, the Plaintiffs here have specifically described that they observe and record

ICE officers in part to express their disapproval of the Operation Metro Surge mission.

While counsel in Molina did not explain the expressive aspect of observing law

enforcement in that case, Plaintiffs have done so here. (Mielke Decl. ¶ 11 (“I have already

and plan to continue to exercise my constitutional right to observe federal authorities’

activities in public places.”); Jackson Decl. ¶ 11 (“Although that scared me, I think it is

important for me to exercise my constitutional right to observe ICE enforcement activity

to ensure that any abuses by ICE is documented.”); Levy Dec. ¶ 15 (“Although this

experience was frightening, I plan to continue to exercise my constitutional right to observe

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and document federal authorities’ activities and presence in public spaces, and to

disseminate information and express my dissent regarding the same.”)27

Because here, Plaintiffs have specifically alleged facts, supported by evidence of

meaningful weight, that they engaged in conduct that the Court finds to be protected by the

First Amendment, they have satisfied the first element of a First Amendment retaliation

claim.

2. Adverse Action

The second element requires Plaintiffs to show that Defendants took adverse action

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected

activity. Garcia, 348 F.3d at 729. The test “is designed to weed out trivial matters from

those deserving the time of the courts as real and substantial violations of the First

Amendment.” Id. at 728.

Defendants do not appear to argue that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate adverse

actions. But they suggest that no chilling has occurred as a result of these actions because

27 The declarations of others, including both named Plaintiffs and non-parties,

contain similar statements. (Burdine Decl. ¶ 9 (“I have also been concerned about what

would happen to my children if I get detained for exercising my constitutional rights

because I am the one who picks them up from school.”); Biestman Decl. ¶ 14 (“I plan to

continue to observe, document, and express my displeasure and disgust with ICE despite

the agents’ threats and intimidation. I feel like I owe it to my grandchildren, my community

and my country to continue to express my Constitutional rights.”); Lee Decl. ¶ 17 (“Despite

this traumatic experience, I have continued to engage in constitutional observation

activities. Even though I am frightened for my safety, I feel an obligation to protest, to bear

witness to ICE’s cruelty and to disseminate information about what I observe.”); Webb

Decl. ¶ 9 (“I should have the right to follow [the agents] and observe them on public streets

and I told them so.”); Page Decl. ¶ 11 (“I have continued to observe, but I am afraid when

I do it. I’m worried my rights will be violated again and that I’ll be detained again.”)

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protests, speech, observation and recording continue, and the named Plaintiffs themselves

continue to engage in such conduct. But the test of “chilling” is an objective one. Id. (noting

that the issue was not whether the jury may have believed the plaintiff’s testimony that she

had been chilled from further exercising her right to protest, but rather one that asks what

“a person of ordinary firmness [would] have done in reaction to the [government’s

actions]”) (cleaned up). And the Eighth Circuit has held that weaponizing “the punitive

machinery of government in order to punish [someone] for speaking out” by imposing

“concrete consequences”

—in Garcia, parking tickets—would chill a person of ordinary

firmness from continuing their conduct. Id. at 729.

The Court finds that a variety of Defendants’ conduct would chill a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in further protected activity. See id. at 728–29. That

conduct includes the drawing and pointing of weapons; the use of pepper spray and other

non-lethal munitions; actual and threatened arrest and detainment of protesters and

observers; and other intimidation tactics. (Dkt. 18 at 23–32.)

Specifically, here, Plaintiffs Tincher and Noor were arrested, and Plaintiff Crenshaw

was doused with a chemical irritant.28 These are adverse government actions that would

have the requisite chilling effect. Plaintiffs presented uncontroverted evidence to support

these claims, and the likelihood that such acts would chill a reasonable person is at least as

28 The Court does not suggest that the federal agents who pointed weapons at and

threatened Plaintiffs Lee, Biestman, and Webb took actions that would not satisfy the

second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim. But the Court analyzes their claims

under the Fourth Amendment and finds that they have demonstrated a likelihood of success

in that context.

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great as the risk of chill found in other cases. See Garcia, 348 F.3d at 729 (noting that a

reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s receipt of parking tickets totaling $39 satisfies

the ordinary-firmness test); see also Watson, 119 F.4th at 557 (finding that an officer’s

drawing of a firearm and statements that he could shoot the plaintiff “easily satisfies the

ordinary firmness test”); Laney, 56 F.4th at 1157 (observing that the use of pepper spray

undisputedly “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from speaking out”) (quotation

omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a fair chance of

prevailing on the second element of their First Amendment retaliation claim.

3. Causal Connection

Finally, the Court turns to the last, and most difficult, element of Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment retaliation claim: causation. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are not likely

to succeed on the merits because they cannot show that any protected activity actually

motivated the challenged adverse actions. According to Defendants, the evidence shows

Plaintiffs “assaulting federal officers, damaging federal property, blocking officers from

leaving a volatile scene where such assaults are occurring, [and] chasing a law enforcement

vehicle,” thus undermining their causation argument. (Dkt. 46 at 13, 31–43.) The Court

disagrees. Of course, these preliminary findings are not final, binding determinations for

later stages of litigation. But, at this point, Plaintiffs have shown that they have a fair chance

of demonstrating that it was their protected conduct—speech, protest, and observation—

that motivated Defendants’ adverse actions.

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Arrests of Tincher and Noor

The Court begins with Ms. Tincher’s activity and her arrest. The record establishes

that, leading up to and during her arrest, she was observing ICE agents where they had

secured a perimeter around a home while trying to effectuate an arrest. (Tincher Decl. ¶ 5;

see also Sorensen Decl. ¶ 9.) But Tincher did not forcibly obstruct or impede the agents’

work. Several witnesses corroborate her account of the events and confirm that she

remained non-violent and did not engage in any threatening or assaultive behavior.

(Sorensen Decl. ¶ 16; Rollins Decl. ¶ 16.) At most, Tincher approached to criticize the

agents’ conduct but maintained a safe distance from the perimeter and where they were

conducting their law enforcement duties. As she stood several feet away from the

perimeter, an officer ordered her to back away, but Ms. Tincher remained where she was

and was then forcibly taken to the ground and placed under arrest. (Tincher Decl. ¶¶ 8–9;

Sorensen Decl. ¶ 10.)

In telling a different story, Defendants claim, based on the Easterwood declaration,

that Ms. Tincher attempted to cross into the perimeter, put up her hands, and tried to push

an ICE officer out of the way, ultimately engaging in unlawful conduct that justified her

arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 111. (Dkt. 46 at 31–32 (citing Easterwood Decl. ¶ 24); see also

Dkt. 79.) As discussed earlier, the Court declines to credit this narrative over the sworn

affidavits in the record.

Therefore, on balance, the Court finds that the record warrants the conclusion that

Ms. Tincher was engaged in protected activity and that such activity was an actual, but-for

cause of her arrest. See Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398 (requiring a plaintiff “to establish a causal

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connection between the government defendant’s retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s

subsequent injury” (cleaned up)). In other words, a plaintiff must establish that “the adverse

action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at

399. Specifically, retaliatory-arrest claims, which “involve causal complexities,” require a

showing that the arresting officers lacked probable cause for the arrest. Watson, 119 F.4th

at 550–51 (quotation omitted).

Defendants argue that Ms. Tincher cannot show retaliatory animus because the ICE

officers who arrested her had at least a reasonable, if mistaken, belief that there was

probable cause to arrest her for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.29 (Dkt. 46 at 33.) The Court

disagrees. Section 111 makes it a crime to “forcibly” assault, resist, impede, intimidate, or

interfere with a federal officer engaged in the performance of their official duties. 18 U.S.C.

§ 111(a)(1). Because “forcibly” as used in the statute “necessarily modifies each of the

listed verbs that follows it,” United States v. Davidson, 108 F.4th 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2024)

(quotation omitted), a violation of § 111 would require some aspect or threat of force.

While shoving an officer would likely satisfy this showing, the evidence supports a finding

that Ms. Tincher did not engage in or threaten such conduct. (Tincher Decl. ¶ 9; Sorenson

Decl. ¶ 10; Rollins Decl. ¶ 14.) Moreover, Defendants do not point the Court to any

authority suggesting that Tincher’s refusal to move back from the perimeter constituted

29 If there is another basis in the law that justifies Defendants’ arrest of Ms. Tincher,

they do not point the Court to it. That aside, the Court declines to explore the complex

question of whether federal immigration officers operating in Minnesota during Operation

Metro Surge are authorized to enforce local ordinances, traffic laws, or arrest people for

misdemeanors, a matter which has been the subject of substantial recent debate but no

briefing in this case.

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“forcibl[e]” interference. See 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Indeed, the evidence does not support

an inference that officers could have reasonably formed a mistaken belief as to probable

cause to arrest Tincher.

Defendants further argue that there cannot be a fair chance that Tincher establishes

retaliatory animus behind her arrest because the only pre-arrest speech she engaged in was

neutral and could not have motivated retaliation. (Dkt. 46 at 32–33.) And, according to

Defendants, others nearby who engaged in more provocative speech “but did not disobey

orders” were not arrested. (Id.) But Defendants’ argument does not acknowledge that

Tincher’s protected conduct was not limited to speech but rather included observing and

protesting, which she was doing peacefully in a public place when she was arrested. And,

the fact that Tincher may have been singled out for arrest among other protesters does not

undermine this finding. Therefore, at this stage, the Court finds Ms. Tincher has a

likelihood of success on showing causation on her First Amendment retaliation claim.

30

The same holds true for Mr. Noor’s arrest, which followed peaceful protected

activity. Noor repeatedly voiced his disapproval of the ICE agents’ actions, told them that

they should let go of a pregnant woman they were holding down, and attempted to get

30 Defendants suggest in their briefing that Ms. Tincher’s alleged resistance after the

officers’ initial use of force also justifies her arrest. But even in Defendants’ unsworn

accounts of what occurred, Ms. Tincher’s purported resistance did not take place until after

the agents had used force with the intent to restrain her. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306,

311–12 (2021) (explaining that a seizure of the person occurs when an officer uses force

with intent to restrain). Those subsequent actions could not have established probable cause

to arrest her before she was seized. Armine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008)

(“[P]robable cause is determined at the moment the arrest was made, [so] any later

developed facts are irrelevant to the probable cause analysis for an arrest.”).

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others in the crowd to stay back and remain calm. (Noor Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 12–13.) After Noor

had made these comments and was continuing to observe and protest, one of the agents

said,

“[L]et’s get this guy,” at which point several other officers approached Mr. Noor,

grabbed him, and threw him to the ground. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Defendants argue that Noor was “participating in a violent protest” and therefore

was not engaged in protected First Amendment activity. (Dkt. 46 at 34.) According to

Defendants, Mr. Noor’s own declaration shows he was part of a disruptive crowd, a fact

that Director Easterwood’s declaration corroborates. (Id. at 35 (citing Easterwood Decl.

¶ 27)). Defendants argue that this supplied probable cause to arrest Noor for violating § 111

by forcibly assaulting officers, thus undermining his retaliation claim. (Id. at 34.) They also

argue that the most plausible inference to draw from Noor’s account “is not that the officers

arrested Noor in retaliation for his speech but because they believed that he was assaulting

them and leading others in such assaults.” (Id. at 35.)

Again, the Court finds Defendants’ position unpersuasive. First, the narrative of

events described in Director Easterwood’s declaration is entitled to less weight.

Easterwood presents a counter-factual narrative that is unattributed to anyone at the scene

and contains unsworn hearsay from police reports. It is largely contradicted by the videos

that were linked to in the Easterwood Declaration or provided by the Defendants after the

hearing. The full record does not provide a sound basis for the Court to conclude, as

Director Easterwood states, that Mr. Noor “threatened to interfere, acted aggressively,

pushed up into ICE officers’ faces, shouted obscenities, and threw rocks and ice at ICE

officers.” (Easterwood Decl. ¶ 27.) In fact, at the time of Mr. Noor’s arrest, which occurs

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well into the provided videos, it appears most likely that the ICE officers were simply fed

up with the protesters generally and Mr. Noor specifically, rather than responding to any

threatening conduct. At no time can Noor be seen physically interfering with the agents,

nor threatening them. Furthermore, in the moments leading up to his arrest, it is Noor who

is pushed by an agent, after which he backs well away from the officers and their squad

car, only for them to step forward to detain him. On this record, there is no basis to conclude

that officers had even mistaken probable cause to place him under arrest. The Court finds

that Mr. Noor is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he was arrested in

retaliation for engaging in protected First Amendment activity.

Plaintiff Crenshaw and Use of Chemical Irritants

The Court also finds that Mr. Crenshaw has shown a fair chance of prevailing on

the merits of his First Amendment retaliation claim. Based on the facts in the record,

Crenshaw protested and observed ICE activity in the Cedar Riverside neighborhood on

December 9, 2025. The crowd became agitated, with some protesters throwing snow and

other items, while others blocked the road at various times to prevent ICE vehicles from

moving. And federal agents deployed chemical irritants on multiple occasions. But there is

no evidence indicating that Crenshaw engaged in any violent acts while verbally protesting

ICE’s actions, including at the critical time an ICE vehicle sprayed Crenshaw with a

chemical irritant while he was standing on the side of the road. (Crenshaw Decl. 1 ¶ 13.)

Video evidence submitted by the parties supports this conclusion. It appears that the

officers who deployed the chemical irritant did so though Mr. Crenshaw was not

obstructing ICE vehicles that were trying to leave. Taken together, the evidence sufficiently

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supports that Mr. Crenshaw has a fair chance of prevailing on his First Amendment

retaliation claim.

Defendants again point to Director Easterwood’s differing account of these events.

While not necessarily inaccurate, his generalized descriptions of what happened do not

rebut Crenshaw’s firsthand account of the relevant events. This is particularly true where

the video evidence shows multiple occasions where nondisruptive protesters walking away

from ICE officers appear to be indiscriminately sprayed with chemical irritants. It is a

reasonable inference at this stage, based on the evidence, that federal agents directly used

chemical irritants on Mr. Crenshaw to punish him for exercising his protected First

Amendment rights to assemble and to observe and protest ICE operations. See Garcia, 348

F.3d at 729.

In opposition, Defendants rely largely on Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, 75 F.4th 895

(8th Cir. 2023), where protester-plaintiffs alleged that an officer violated their First

Amendment rights by pepper spraying them in retaliation for their protected expression.

There, the court concluded that the officer was entitled to summary judgment because there

was no evidence that he “singled out” the plaintiffs for their protected activity. Id. at 899.

In doing so, the court emphasized that the officer had deployed the pepper spray in a “wide

arc . . . target[ing] people who were within a 20-foot diameter,

” which suggested that “no

individual was targeted for [their] speech.” Id. at 899–900 (“One cannot simultaneously

single out the appellants and ‘indiscriminately’ spray the crowd.”). And, there was no

evidence that the officer was aware of the plaintiffs’ presence or had previously interacted

with them, making it unlikely that they were singled out. Id. at 900. But Aldridge does not

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hold that the use of pepper spray at a group of protesters could never support a finding of

retaliatory animus. In fact, counsel for Defendants conceded at the hearing that being

“singled out” in this context would not require that the person be the only one exposed to

the use of force. (Dkt. 81 at 67–69.) Instead, all that is required is a clear causal relationship

between the protected activity and the retaliation. Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398.

Because the evidence shows that Mr. Crenshaw was engaged in protected First

Amendment activity when he was pepper-sprayed, without an “obvious alternative

explanation” for that use of force, see Aldridge. 75 F.4th at 899–900,

31 the Court finds that

he has demonstrated a fair chance of prevailing on the first element of his First Amendment

retaliation claim.

B. First Amendment Content and Viewpoint Discrimination

Plaintiffs also argue that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their First

Amendment content- and viewpoint-discrimination claims. (Dkt. 18 at 38–39.) The Court

has made an effort to understand the nature of the claims Plaintiffs are advancing through

a careful review of the Complaint, the briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction,

31 This also distinguishes Crenshaw’s situation from that involved in Mitchell v.

Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888 (8th Cir. 2022). There, the only plausible inference to be drawn

from the allegations in the complaint was an obvious alternative explanation to retaliatory

animus—the officers shot the plaintiff with a bean bag round not because he was engaged

in protected activity, but because he was occupying a place on the bridge that the officers

had declared a protected area near a law enforcement blockade. Id. at 896–97. Likewise,

in Laney v. City of St. Louis, 56 F.4th 1153 (8th Cir. 2023), the plaintiff could not establish

a causal connection because the officer who pepper-sprayed him had not heard his critical

speech and only later saw him in a threatening standoff with an officer when the irritant

was deployed. Id. at 1157–58.

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and the discussion at oral argument. But exactly what is being asserted as a content- and

viewpoint-based discrimination claim remains elusive.

The Complaint does not clearly set forth a standalone claim of content- or

viewpoint-based discrimination in the section identifying separate counts. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 10(b). Under Count I, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ conduct violates their First

Amendment rights under a “Free Speech, Free Press, Free Assembly” heading. (Dkt. 1, 56

(Count I); see also id. ¶¶ 190–96.) However, as pled, it is unclear how this claim differs

from their retaliation claim, as pled in Count II.

Further complicating the Court’s task is the Plaintiffs’ discussion of this claim in

their briefing on the preliminary-injunction motion. Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants have

favored certain speakers who endorse ICE’s objectives at the expense of others. For

instance, Dan Engelhart explains that while he was being harassed by ICE agents for

following and recording them, the agents were simultaneously being followed by a pro-

ICE media outlet, ‘Real America’s Voice[,]’” thereby granting favorable treatment to those

whose viewpoint the government prefers over others whose viewpoint is critical of ICE.

(See Dkt. 18 at 38–39.) But allegations relating to Defendants’ preference for certain media

outlets with a specific pro-enforcement viewpoint over others who are opposed is not set

forth in any count in the Complaint as a standalone claim.

More importantly, the briefing on the motion is relatively undeveloped on the

content- and viewpoint-based discrimination claims. Plaintiffs do not point to any

standards by which the Court should evaluate whether they are likely to succeed on the

merits of those claims. Certainly, government attempts to prohibit speech based on its

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content or on the speaker’s viewpoint are particularly disfavored. See Thunderhawk v.

Cnty. of Morton, 701 F. Supp. 3d 849, 859 (D.N.D. 2023) (noting that “content-based

restrictions are presumptively invalid” and that the government cannot allow the use of a

forum it has created by some and not others based on their views (quotation omitted)).

However, in their opening memorandum, Plaintiffs cite only to cases discussing viewpoint

discrimination in contexts quite different from those presented here. Specifically, Plaintiffs

rely on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819

(1995), which addressed the First Amendment’s protection against viewpoint-based

prohibitions on speech when the government provides a limited public forum. 515 U.S. at

828. They also rely on Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 897 (8th Cir. 2017), which

concerned a plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to a funeral picketing law that was allegedly

viewpoint-discriminatory.

At this stage, the Court cannot find a likelihood of success on the merits of a non-

retaliation First Amendment claim.

C. Fourth Amendment

The Court turns next to whether Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on

the merits of their Fourth Amendment claims. Having found a likelihood of success on the

First Amendment claims of Plaintiffs Tincher, Noor, and Crenshaw, the Court focuses on

whether Plaintiffs have a fair chance of showing that Plaintiffs Biestman, Lee, and Webb

were subjected to unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court

finds that they do.

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The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S.

Const. amend. IV. Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers can

reasonably conduct brief, investigatory stops within certain limits. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 24–25 (1968). To make a Terry stop, there must be a “reasonable, articulable suspicion

that a person is committing or is about to commit a crime.” United States v. Stokes, 62 F.4th

1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).

While reasonable, articulable suspicion is not a high bar, a law enforcement officer

“must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” United States v. McMillion,

101 F.4th 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted); Stokes, 62 F.4th at 1107 (“[O]fficers

must be able to point to specific facts that justify the seizure and more than simply an

‘inarticulate hunch.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22) (cleaned up)). Further, reasonable

suspicion must be “particularized” to “the particular person stopped [for] . . . criminal

activity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014). Whether reasonable,

articulatable suspicion exists “is determined by the totality of the circumstances, taking

into account an officer’s deductions and rational inferences resulting from relevant training

and experience.” United States v. Horton, 611 F.3d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 2010).

There is no question that Plaintiffs Biestman, Lee, and Webb were subject to a Terry

stop. Rather, the issue is whether the officers in question had reasonable, articulatable

suspicion to stop them. Biestman, Lee, and Webb allege the same relevant facts regarding

their stops: each of these Plaintiffs observed an unmarked vehicle that they believed to be

federal law enforcement; they followed the vehicle while driving lawfully and keeping a

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reasonable distance; and Plaintiffs’ vehicles were then stopped and surrounded by agents,

constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Biestman Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Lee Decl.

¶¶ 7–9; Webb Decl. ¶¶ 3–8.) These uncontroverted facts establish a violation of Plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment rights because the totality of the circumstances points to no reasonable

basis for a Terry stop.

Defendants do not deny Biestman, Lee, or Webb’s allegations. Nor do Defendants

offer any allegations to the contrary about objective, particularized observations that would

provide a valid basis for why the ICE agents might have believed any of these specific

Plaintiffs was engaged in criminal activity. Instead, Defendants rely on Director

Easterwood’s statements that “[i]n recent months, drivers in the Twin Cities area have

frequently followed ICE vehicles aggressively and erratically,

” giving rise to public safety

concerns. (Dkt. 46 at 48 (citing Easterwood Decl. ¶ 29).) In addition, Defendants note that:

(1) Webb admits to having driven slightly faster than traffic while following an ICE vehicle

on the freeway; (2) some declarants have followed ICE vehicles back to ICE’s Minneapolis

office; (3) some persons have stated that they followed ICE vehicles in groups or placed

their vehicles between ICE vehicles in a caravan; (4) many have honked at ICE vehicles

while following; and (5) some have followed ICE vehicles for several loops through the

same area. (Dkt. 46 at 36–37, 48.) And Defendants contend that “[t]his conduct gave

officers reasonable suspicion that the drivers could be violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 by

interfering or impeding law enforcement through the forcible operation of an automobile.”

(Dkt. 46 at 48.)

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The Court is not persuaded for several reasons. First, and most importantly, these

averments fall short of showing that the officers who stopped Lee, Biestman, and Webb

had any particularized suspicion of forcible interference with or impeding of federal law

enforcement officers in the course of their duties. United States v. McLemore, 887 F.3d 861,

865 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[A]s the Supreme Court’s governing standard demands, . . . the

determination of reasonable suspicion is fact specific, requiring the government to establish

that the officer had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person

stopped of breaking the law.’”) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)).

Though the Court declines to wade into whether federal immigration enforcement officers

have any authority to enforce Minnesota’s traffic laws, Defendants do not even assert that

the named plaintiffs were breaking such laws at all. And the Defendants point to no law or

statute that prohibits citizens from safely following law enforcement officers performing

their duties in non-emergency situations.

Nor is the Court persuaded by Defendants’ suggestion at the hearing that the “overall

climate of following” rendered the stops of Lee, Biestman, and Webb in this case

reasonable. (Dkt. 81 at 62.) Again, no evidence in the record supports a conclusion that

Biestman, Lee, or Webb displayed hostile, menacing, or threatening conduct to the agents

or that they created safety concerns. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find any

support for reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 111. Cf. United States v. Schrader, 10

F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Force is a necessary element of any § 111 violation. . . .

[T]hat element may be satisfied by proof of actual physical contact, or by proof of such a

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threat or display of physical aggression toward the officer as to inspire fear of pain, bodily

harm, or death.”) (quotation omitted).

32

It is important to note that not every protesting motorist engaged in following ICE

vehicles drives safely and lawfully; nor do they refrain from using their vehicles in a way

that could give rise to reasonable suspicion of a § 111 violation. And the Court is mindful

of the potential safety concerns to officers and the public that can arise from such conduct.

Therefore, given that the reasonable-articulable-suspicion standard depends on the totality

of the circumstances, the Court has carefully considered and weighed Director

Easterwood’s account of how vehicles have been used by observers to protest ICE activity

in the Twin Cities. But, even crediting his statements about incidents of misconduct among

other people following Operation Metro Surge, it simply does not establish reasonable,

articulable suspicion to stop as to these particular plaintiffs. Florida. v. Royer, 460 U.S.

491, 525 (1983) (noting that “conformity with certain aspects of [a criminal] profile does

not automatically create a particularized suspicion which will justify an investigatory

stop”) (quotation omitted). There may be ample suspicion to stop cars, and even arrest

drivers, engaged in dangerous conduct while following immigration enforcement officers,

but that does not justify stops of cars not breaking the law.

32 It is worth noting that Plaintiffs and other declarants describe officers involved in

these incidents as engaging in conduct that goes far beyond what is necessary for a routine

traffic stop. Guns were carried, drawn, pointed, and brandished. More than one declarant

was followed home, or told that they would be visited at home.

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V. Balance of Harms

A. Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm

sufficient to support a preliminary injunction pending the ultimate outcome of this

litigation. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that by demonstrating a likelihood of success

on their constitutional claims, they have also supported a finding of irreparable harm. See

Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 456–57 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.

347, 373 (1976) (explaining that the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”); Marcus v. Iowa Pub.

Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 1996) (“If [movants] are correct and their First

Amendment rights have been violated, this constitutes an irreparable harm.” (citing Elrod,

427 U.S. at 373)); Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, 338 F.R.D. 109, 119 (D. Minn. 2021)

(same); Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, No. 25 C 12173, 2025 WL 3240782, at *87 (N.D.

Ill. Nov. 20, 2025). The alleged First Amendment violations here speak for themselves.

It is unclear whether Plaintiffs have another remedy available to them for their First

Amendment injuries, aside from injunctive relief. This differs from the Fourth Amendment

context, where plaintiffs whose rights are violated, even by federal agents, may have a

remedy available at law because they can bring an action to recover damages. See Bivens

v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395–96 (1971). But even as to the Fourth

Amendment claims, the availability of damages “does not necessarily preclude issuance of

a preliminary injunction, because damages relief may not fully compensate the movant for

being denied [their] rights.” Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 1248

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(N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Glenwood Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 371–

72 (8th Cir. 1991)).

Here, the record before the Court and the events unfolding daily in the greater Twin

Cities area reveal that Defendants’ challenged conduct, including stopping drivers without

a reasonable, particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, is ongoing. Therefore, money

damages are unlikely to fully compensate members of the community for “less tangible

injuries [that] cannot be so easily valuated or compensated.” Id. Under these circumstances,

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a threat of irreparable harm with respect to both

their Fourth Amendment claims “because of the ongoing nature of the alleged violation of

their Fourth Amendment rights, with monetary damages insufficient to compensate them

for the repetitive constitutional violations.” Chicago Headline Club, 2025 WL 3240782, at

*87 (citing cases).

Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ showing of irreparable harm, arguing that they have

not shown a threat that is sufficiently imminent. (Dkt. 46 at 51–52.) Essentially, Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs “fail[ed] [to] offer anything more than a smattering of one-time

isolated past incidents,” which “fatally undermines” any of their claims “that a preliminary

injunction is necessary to prevent an immediate threat of harm recurring while the Court

resolves the merits of their claims.” (Id. at 52.) The Court disagrees.

At the time the Complaint was filed, Operation Metro Surge had already been

ongoing for two weeks. In the month since then, it has grown almost exponentially, with

widespread estimates that there are now 3,000 immigration enforcement officers operating

in Minnesota, most of them in the Twin Cities. And in the meantime, members of the Twin

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Cities communities, including the named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class, have

continued to observe, record, and protest the presence and actions of the immigration

officers participating in the operation. There is no sign that this operation is winding

down—indeed, it appears to still be ramping up.

In some cases where allegations of civil rights violations are raised, defendants

concede the illegality of the challenged conduct but oppose injunctive relief on the ground

that the conduct was isolated. Here, in contrast, Defendants maintain that the actions of

their officers are a lawful response to ongoing widespread protest activity. This indicates

to the Court that the challenged conduct is likely to continue absent injunctive relief.

B. Harm to the Defendants and the Public Interest

Of course, the Court must balance the risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs in the

absence of injunctive relief, against any harm to Defendants if an injunction were granted.

And the Court must also consider if injunctive relief is in the public interest.

Defendants argue that issuance of an injunction would irreparably harm the

government and contravene the public interest because it will prevent officers from being

able to respond to disruptive and violent protests in Minnesota, further endangering officer

and public safety. The Court recognizes that an overreaching injunction could have such

an effect. However, Defendants do not explain why it is necessary for them to arrest and

use force against peaceful observers, like the named Plaintiffs and similarly situated

nonviolent protesters, to curb other violence or attempts to forcibly obstruct their

operations. Nor do Defendants explain how the public interest is served by officers

stopping law-abiding motorists without reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal

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wrongdoing. To be clear, the Court’s injunction does nothing to prevent Defendants from

continuing to enforce immigration laws. Chicago Headline Club, 2025 WL 3240782, at

*88. But it does not constitute irreparable harm to require the government to honor the

constitutional rights of those who peacefully protest and observe law enforcement

activities. Id. (citing Exodus Refugee Immigr., Inc. v. Pence, 165 F. Supp. 3d 718, 740 (S.D.

Ind. 2016)).

Finally, Defendants suggest that the entry of an injunction will “turn[] the separation

of powers on its head by installing this Court as the overseer of every crowd-control and

use-of-force decision that federal law-enforcement officers in Minnesota make in the

context of often tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations.” (Dkt. 46 at 52 (quotation

omitted).) Once again, the Court takes the point and observes that an overly prescriptive

injunction risks doing just that. Indeed, this separation-of-powers concern may have been

more justified at the outset of this case, when Plaintiffs initially requested sweeping

injunctive relief in the context of their motion for a temporary restraining order. But after

this Court expressed skepticism about the scope of the TRO that Plaintiffs initially sought,

they submitted a significantly scaled-back request for proposed injunctive relief. And the

injunction the Court adopts in this Order is narrower still.

Finally, the Court emphasizes that the protection of constitutional rights is afforded

significant deference in caselaw addressing the balancing-of-harms factor. “Generally, if a

party shows a likely violation of [their] First Amendment rights, the other requirements for

obtaining a preliminary injunction are deemed to have been satisfied.” Rodgers v. Bryant,

942 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.

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Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc)) (cleaned up). And it is “always in

the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Goyette, 338

F.R.D. at 120 (quoting Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)).

“Constitutional rights are not diminished during a period of ‘chaotic unrest.’” Id. (quoting

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866)).

In granting the injunctive relief set forth in this Order, the Court has endeavored to

balance the ongoing irreparable harm to Plaintiffs against harm to Defendants from limiting

their activities, as well as any possible harm to the public. The Court has narrowly tailored

the injunctive relief and endeavored to clearly define its scope.

VI. Scope of Relief

A. Class-wide Relief

Plaintiffs have asserted the claims here on behalf of not only themselves

individually, but on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals defined as: “All

persons who do or will in the future record, observe, and/or protest against the DHS

immigration operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.”

(Dkt. 1 ¶ 179.) While Plaintiffs have not moved for class certification, nor has the Court

granted it, Plaintiffs seek immediate interim relief on a class-wide basis. The Court

concludes that limited class-wide relief is appropriate at this stage, and disagrees that recent

Supreme Court jurisprudence forecloses that route.

In its recent decision in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, the Supreme Court affirmed that “courts

may issue temporary relief to a putative class[.]” 605 U.S. 91, 98 (2025); see Padres Unidos

de Tulsa v. Drummond, 783 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1350–51 (W.D. Okla. 2025) (“Numerous

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courts have found provisional certification alone sufficient for purposes of awarding

preliminary relief.”) (collecting cases). Citing the treatise Newberg and Rubenstein on

Class Actions for its authority, the A.A.R.P. Court set aside the need to certify a class before

issuing temporary injunctive relief. A.A.R.P., 605 U.S. at 98 (“[W]e need not decide

whether a class should be certified as to the detainees’ due process claims in order to

temporarily enjoin the Government from removing putative class members while the

question of what notice is due is adjudicated.”). Subsequently, unpacking the high court’s

decision in which it was singly cited, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions concluded:

“Put differently, the Court’s holding means that the filing of a class suit (‘a putative class’),

coupled with a showing that the standard for interim relief has been met, is sufficient to

enable such relief to the entire putative class. Nothing more, in terms of class certification,

is necessary.” 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 4:30 (6th ed.

Dec. 2025 update).

While unfamiliar in some respects, the Supreme Court’s decision functionally tracks

with a body of well-established caselaw allowing courts to issue a class-wide preliminary

injunction before determining if class certification is appropriate. See Gooch v. Life Invs.

Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 433 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Simply put, there is nothing improper

about a preliminary injunction preceding a ruling on class certification.”); Just Film, Inc.

v. Merch. Servs., Inc., 474 F. App’x 493, 495 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court did not

abuse its discretion by finding sufficient evidence to support its preliminary injunction,

which was carefully tailored to maintain the status quo where class certification is

pending[.]”); Yang v. Kellner, 458 F. Supp. 3d 199, 218 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.) (“The Court need

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not formally certify a class in order to issue the requested preliminary relief.”), aff’d sub

nom. Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2020); Rubenstein, § 4:30 & n.12 (“[A] court

may issue a classwide preliminary injunction in a putative class action suit prior to a ruling

on the class certification motion[.]”) (collecting cases).

Defendants cite Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 843 (2025) in support of their

contention that relief any class members beyond the named Plaintiffs is outside the Court’s

authority. CASA, issued a little more than a month after A.A.R.P., grappled with the scope

of Judiciary Act of 1789’s grant of equitable power and whether so-called universal

injunctions were traditionally recognized within such power. There, the universal

preliminary injunctions issued by the district courts barred certain executive officials from

applying the policy at issue not just the parties before the district court, but to anyone in

the country. Id. at 839. As reasoning for disallowing the use of universal injunctions, the

high court restated a longstanding principle of equitable relief that federal courts are

restricted to granting “complete relief between the parties.” Id. at 851 (quoting Kinney-

Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 507 (1928)) (emphasis in CASA); see id. at 852

(“Under this principle, the question is not whether an injunction offers complete relief to

everyone potentially affected by an allegedly unlawful act; it is whether an injunction will

offer complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.

” (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442

U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant

than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.

”))) (emphasis in CASA). In

addition to expressing a general concern about the potential for overreach through universal

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injunctions, the Supreme Court reasoned that universal injunctions provide an illogical

“workaround” to Rule 23 class actions. Id. at 850.

But nowhere does CASA suggest that issuance of class-wide relief in a preliminary

injunction is improper. Instead, its reasoning affirms class actions and their remedies. First,

while the CASA Court proscribes universal injunctions for lack of a historical analogue, the

court did recognize such an analogue for class actions: bills of peace. Id. at 847–849.

Because, the court concluded, bills of peace granted relief to a “group [that] was small and

cohesive,” rather than “resolve[d] a question of legal interpretation for the entire realm,

”

universal injunctions were distinguishable and thus lacked historical support. Id. at 848;

see Am. Council of Learned Societies v. McDonald, 792 F. Supp. 3d 448, 498 (S.D.N.Y.

2025) (concluding that this distinction “counsels [the court] that limited preliminary relief

for a purported but still defined class of individuals is not the type of relief prohibiting the

enforcement of a law or policy against anyone, to which the decision in CASA applied.”)

(citing CASA, 606 U.S. at 837) (cleaned up). In addition, CASA implicitly blesses class

actions as an appropriate alternative to universal injunctions for widespread relief, again

distinguishing the two. CASA, 606 U.S. at 849 (discussing why Rule 23 class actions are a

more appropriate avenue for broad relief). This discussion leaves no doubt that class

actions and class-wide relief continue to be good law. See McDonald, 792 F. Supp. 3d at

496–97 (“While CASA did away with district courts’ ability to issue universal injunctions

that enjoin a defendant’s actions against anyone, the class-wide relief that Plaintiffs are

seeking in this case appears to have been largely blessed by the Court’s majority opinion.”);

Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1063 (7th Cir. 2025)

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(“CASA involved a universal injunction that prevented the government from enforcing its

policies against nonparties; this case involves a Rule 23 class action.”).

Defendants instead rely on a strained reading of CASA’s central and reanimated

principle: that federal courts’ equitable power cannot justify granting relief to non-parties.

CASA, 606 U.S. at 851 (citation omitted). This reading operates on the assumption that the

absent class members are not parties for purpose of this, or any other, class action. But the

Court thinks Defendants are wrong in both form and function. As to the former, absent

class members, even before class certification, can be considered “parties” in some

circumstances. Rubenstein, § 4:30. But even if they couldn’t, Defendants’ extremely

narrow reading of CASA would not only contradict CASA’s own reasoning, but also wipe

a body of caselaw off the map without discussion. That cannot be the case.33

Because interim class-wide relief here is consistent with Supreme Court precedent

in both CASA and A.A.R.P., the Court’s preliminary injunction includes named Plaintiffs

and members of the following class: “All persons who do or will in the future record,

observe, and/or protest against Operation Metro Surge and related operations that have

been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.”

33 An open question remains as to whether CASA’s emphasis on applying the

strictures of Rule 23 when granting class-wide relief undercuts the court’s grant of class-

wide preliminary relief in A.A.R.P. The Court finds it doubtful that the Supreme Court,

through reasoning alone, so sharply reversed course that it indirectly invalidated its own

rule of law issued just 42 days earlier. McDonald, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (“There is no

reason for me to assume that the Court in CASA intended to walk back a pronouncement it

made the previous month in A.A.R.P.”).

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B. Narrowly Tailored

The Court declines to adopt either version of the injunction submitted by the

Plaintiffs. Instead, the Court adopts both a declaration of the relevant law and an injunction

that are less broad and more tailored to the analysis of this order.34

First, the Court notes that the injunctive relief it can Order is necessarily limited by

the claims and allegations raised by the Plaintiffs. Although the Court provides provisional

class-wide relief to a class of similarly situated protesters and observers, it cannot order the

Defendants to desist from conduct that the Plaintiffs themselves have not experienced.

Therefore, any requests related to the volume or circumstances of crowd dispersal orders

are not properly before the Court.

Similarly, although it is likely that recording law enforcement activities through

video or audio on a cellphone is generally protected conduct under the First Amendment

for the same reason that observing is, none of the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants

infringed on that right specifically, seized their phones, or ordered them to stop recording.

Therefore, this injunction does not specifically address recording as a distinct protected

activity.

The Court is also mindful that the protest activity being engaged in by protesters

and observers in response to Operation Metro Surge is somewhat unique. There is little

34 The Court observes that the Defendants have offered few specific challenges to

the narrower injunction terms sought by the Plaintiffs in their second Proposed Order

(Dkt. 38). They do not specifically raise any concerns about workability, overbreadth, or

administration of that proposal. Nonetheless, the Court has considered those issues in

issuing this Order.

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discussion in the caselaw about situations like the ones playing out all over the Twin Cities,

in which small groups of protesters are mobile and gather wherever immigration officers

are attempting to make arrests or otherwise enforce immigration laws. Therefore, the Court

hesitates to adopt overly prescriptive rules that will prevent the Defendants from

responding as necessary to such protest activity when it crosses the line from protected to

unlawful.

Finally, the Defendants expressed concern about the statewide nature of the relief

sought by the Plaintiffs, and suggested that it could hamper totally unrelated activities of

other federal law enforcement offices throughout Minnesota. Therefore, the Court has

limited the language used in the injunction to the Defendants and their officers and agents

engaging in immigration enforcement activities as part of the current Operation Metro

Surge. While the Court declines to specify a geographic limitation at this time because the

operation is expanding beyond Minneapolis and St. Paul, it makes clear that the regularly

conducted business of Border Patrol agents on the northern border, Coast Guard officers

on the Great Lakes, customs officials at the airports, and other federal officers doing their

work unrelated to Operation Metro Surge are not covered by the injunction.

VII. Bond

Rule 65(c) states that “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary

restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers

proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully

enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The amount of bond, however, “rests within

the sound discretion of the trial court[.]” Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Co-op. Corp., 528

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F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1976). “Courts in [the Eighth Circuit] have almost always required

a bond before issuing a preliminary injunction . . ., but exceptions have been made where

the defendant has not objected to the failure to require a bond or where the damages

resulting from a wrongful issuance of an injunction have not been shown.”

Richland/Wilkin, 826 F.3d at 1043 (citation omitted). Further, the Eighth Circuit has

approved of a district court waiving the bond requirement based on “the important public

interest in the enforcement of” federal law. Id. (collecting cases where district courts

required no, or minimal, bond where injunctions enforced the National Environmental

Policy Act).

The Court declines to issue a bond here for two reasons. First, while Defendants

have requested that the Court require a bond commensurate with the scope of its injunction

(Dkt. 46 at 68), they do not articulate with any specificity the likely costs and damages it

would sustain from an incorrectly issued injunction. Without those figures, the Court is

only left to speculate on what amount may be appropriate. And second, this injunction

serves the important public interest in the enforcement of the constitutional rights of

Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. And because “[i]t is always in the public interest to

prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights,” the Court finds no bond is

appropriate here. Goyette, 338 F.R.D. at 120 (quoting Connection Distrib. Co., 154 F.3d at

288); Bukaka, Inc. v. Cnty. of Benton, 852 F. Supp. 807, 813 (D. Minn. 1993) (“[P]laintiff

seeks to vindicate important first amendment rights. Requiring it to provide a security could

prevent judicial review of the [law’s] constitutionality. Under the circumstances, the

requirement of a security should be waived.”).

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VIII. Stay Pending Appeal

Finally, Defendants ask the Court to stay its Order pending appeal. (Dkt. 46 at 68.)

In determining if a stay pending appeal is appropriate, courts consider:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that

he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant

will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance

of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested

in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Kansas v. United States, 124 F.4th 529, 533 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at

434). The party moving for a stay pending appeal “bears the burden of showing that the

circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).

Defendants here have not addressed any of the above factors in their request or explain

why a stay is appropriate, failing to meet their burden. Because none of these factors

support a stay here, the Court denies Defendants request for a stay pending appeal. Of

course, either party can seek such a stay from the Court of Appeals.

ORDER

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED IN PART.

1. This order applies to individual Plaintiffs and to all persons who do or will in the

future record, observe, and/or protest Operation Metro Surge and related operations

that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.

2. This Injunction applies to Defendants and their officers and agents operating in the

District of Minnesota to conduct immigration enforcement activities as part of

Operation Metro Surge. It also applies to Defendants and their officers and agents

responding to protests that arise in response to Operation Metro Surge. (Hereinafter

“Covered Federal Agents.”) This Injunction does not apply to Defendants and their

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officers and agents otherwise conducting routine operations within the District of

Minnesota.

3. Covered Federal Agents are hereby enjoined from:

a. Retaliating against persons who are engaging in peaceful and unobstructive

protest activity, including observing the activities of Operation Metro Surge.

b. Arresting or detaining persons who are engaging in peaceful and

unobstructive protest activity, including observing the activities of Operation

Metro Surge, in retaliation for their protected conduct and absent a showing

of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a

crime or is obstructing or interfering with the activities of Covered Federal

Officers.

c. Using pepper-spray or similar nonlethal munitions and crowd dispersal tools

against persons who are engaging in peaceful and unobstructive protest

activity, including observing the activities of Operation Metro Surge, in

retaliation for their protected conduct.

d. Stopping or detaining drivers and passengers in vehicles where there is no

reasonable articulable suspicion that they are forcibly obstructing or

interfering with Covered Federal Agents, or otherwise violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 111. The act of safely following Covered Federal Agents at an appropriate

distance does not, by itself, create reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle

stop.

4. Dissemination of this Order

a. The Defendants must widely disseminate notice of this Order to all Covered

Federal Agents, including providing copies in paper or electronic format.

b. The Order must be distributed to all Covered Federal Agents and all

Defendants within 72 hours of its issuance.

c. The Order must be distributed to all newly deployed Covered Federal Agents

that arrive in Minnesota to take part in Operation Metro Surge.

5. This Order shall remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge concludes or the

conditions change such that it is no longer necessary. If any party believes that the

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6. surge has come to an end or that the injunction is no longer necessary, they may file

a motion for its termination.

Either party may seek to modify this Order by filing a motion with the Court.

Date: January 16, 2026 s/Katherine Menendez

Katherine Menendez

United States District Judge